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Abstract
In this paper, we initiate a systematic investigation of differentially private algorithms for convex
empirical risk minimization. Various instantiations of this problem have been studied before. We pro-
vide new algorithms and matching lower bounds for private ERM assuming only that each data point’s
contribution to the loss function is Lipschitz bounded and that the domain of optimization is bounded.
We provide a separate set of algorithms and matching lower bounds for the setting in which the loss
functions are known to also be strongly convex.
Our algorithms run in polynomial time, and in some cases even match the optimal nonprivate running
time (as measured by oracle complexity). We give separate algorithms (and lower bounds) for (, 0)- and
(, δ)-differential privacy; perhaps surprisingly, the techniques used for designing optimal algorithms in
the two cases are completely different.
Our lower bounds apply even to very simple, smooth function families, such as linear and quadratic
functions. This implies that algorithms from previous work can be used to obtain optimal error rates,
under the additional assumption that the contributions of each data point to the loss function is smooth.
We show that simple approaches to smoothing arbitrary loss functions (in order to apply previous tech-
niques) do not yield optimal error rates. In particular, optimal algorithms were not previously known for
problems such as training support vector machines and the high-dimensional median.
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1 Introduction
Convex optimization is one of the most basic and powerful computational tools in statistics and machine
learning. It is most commonly used for empirical risk minimization (ERM): the data set D = {d1, ..., dn}
defines a convex loss function L(·) which is minimized over a convex set C. When run on sensitive data,
however, the results of convex ERM can leak sensitive information. For example, medians and support
vector machine parameters can, in many cases, leak entire records in the clear (see “Motivation”, below).
In this paper, we provide new algorithms and matching lower bounds for differentially private convex
ERM assuming only that each data point’s contribution to the loss function is Lipschitz and that the domain
of optimization is bounded. This builds on a line of work started by Chaudhuri et al. [11].
Problem formulation. Given a data set D = {d1, ..., dn} drawn from a universe X , and a closed, convex
set C, our goal is to
minimize L(θ;D) =
n∑
i=1
`(θ; di) over θ ∈ C
The map ` defines, for each data point d, a loss function `(·; d) on C. We will generally assume that `(·; d)
is convex and L-Lipschitz for all d ∈ X . One obtains variants on this basic problem by assuming additional
restrictions, such as (i) that `(·; d) is ∆-strongly convex for all d ∈ X , and/or (ii) that `(·; d) is β-smooth
for all d ∈ X . Definitions of Lipschitz, strong convexity and smoothness are provided at the end of the
introduction.
For example, given a collection of data points in Rp, the Euclidean 1-median is a point in Rp that
minimizes the sum of the Euclidean distances to the data points. That is, `(θ; di) = ‖θ − di‖2, which is
1-Lipschitz in θ for any choice of di. Another common example is the support vector machine (SVM): given
a data point di = (xi, yi) ∈ Rp × {−1, 1}, one defines a loss function `(θ; di) = hinge(yi · 〈θ, xi〉), where
hinge(z) = (1− z)+ (here (1− z)+ equals 1− z for z ≤ 1 and 0, otherwise). The loss is L-Lipshitz in θ
when ‖xi‖2 ≤ L.
Our formulation also captures regularized ERM, in which an additional (convex) function r(θ) is added
to the loss function to penalize certain types of solutions; the loss function is then r(θ) +
∑n
i=1 `(θ; di).
One can fold the regularizer r(·) into the data-dependent functions by replacing `(θ; di) with ˜`(θ; di) =
`(θ; di) +
1
nr(θ), so that L(θ;D) =
∑
i
˜`(θ; di). This folding comes at some loss of generality (since it
may increase the Lipschitz constant), but it does not affect asymptotic results. Note that if r is ∆n-strongly
convex, then every ˜` is ∆-strongly convex.
We measure the success of our algorithms by the worst-case (over inputs) expected excess empirical
risk, namely
E(L(θˆ;D)− L(θ∗;D)), (1)
where θˆ is the output of the algorithm, θ∗ = arg minθ∈C L(θ;D) is the true minimizer, and the expectation
is only over the coins of the algorithm. Expected risk guarantees can be converted to high-probability
guarantees using standard amplification techniques (see Appendix D for details).
Another important measure of performance is an algorithm’s (excess) generalization error, where loss
is measured with respect to the average over an unknown distribution from which the data are assumed
to be drawn i.i.d.. Our upper bounds on empirical risk imply upper bounds on generalization error (via
uniform convergence and similar ideas); the resulting bounds are only known to be tight in certain ranges of
parameters, however. Detailed statements may be found in Appendix F.
Motivation. Convex ERM is used for fitting models from simple least-squares regression to support vector
machines, and their use may have significant implications to privacy. As a simple example, note that the
1
Euclidean 1-median of a data set will typically be an actual data point, since the gradient of the loss function
has discontinuities at each of the di. (Thinking about the one-dimensional median, where there is always a
data point that minimizes the loss, is helpful.) Thus, releasing the median may well reveal one of the data
points in the clear. A more subtle example is the support vector machine (SVM). The solution to an SVM
program is often presented in its dual form, whose coefficients typically consist of a set of p+ 1 exact data
points. Kasiviswanathan et al. [32] show how the results of many convex ERM problems can be combined
to carry out reconstruction attacks in the spirit of Dinur and Nissim [16].
Differential privacy is a rigorous notion of privacy that emerged from a line of work in theoretical computer
science and cryptography [19, 6, 21]. We say two data sets D and D′ of size n are neighbors if they differ
in one entry (that is, |D4D′| = 2). A randomized algorithm A is (, δ)-differentially private (Dwork et al.
[21, 20]) if, for all neighboring data sets D and D′ and for all events S in the output space of A, we have
Pr(A(D) ∈ S) ≤ e Pr(A(D′) ∈ S) + δ .
Algorithms that satisfy differential privacy for  < 1 and δ  1/n provide meaningful privacy guarantees,
even in the presence of side information. In particular, they avoid the problems mentioned in “Motivation”
above. See Dwork [18], Kasiviswanathan and Smith [30], Kifer and Machanavajjhala [33] for discussion of
the “semantics” of differential privacy.
Setting Parameters. We will aim to quantify the role of several basic parameters on the excess risk of
differentially private algorithms: the size of the data set n, the dimension p of the parameter space C, the
Lipschitz constant L of the loss functions, the diameter ‖C‖2 of the constraint set and, when applicable, the
strong convexity ∆.
We may take L and ‖C‖2 to be 1 without loss of generality: We can set ‖C‖2 = 1 by rescaling θ
(replacing by θ with θ · ‖C‖2); we can then set L = 1 by rescaling the loss function L (replacing L by L/L).
These two transformations change the excess risk by L‖C‖2. The parameter ∆ cannot similarly be rescaled
while keeping L and ‖C‖2 the same. However, we always have ∆ ≤ 2L/‖C‖2.
In the sequel, we thus focus on the setting where L = ‖C‖2 = 1 and ∆ ∈ [0, 2]. To convert excess risk
bounds for L = ‖C‖2 = 1 to the general setting, one can multiply the risk bounds by L‖C‖2, and replace ∆
by ∆‖C‖2L .
1.1 Contributions
We give algorithms that significantly improve on the state of the art for optimizing non-smooth loss functions
— for both the general case and strongly convex functions, we improve the excess risk bounds by a factor
of
√
n, asymptotically. The algorithms we give for (, 0)- and (, δ)-differential privacy work on very
different principles. We group the algorithms below by technique: gradient descent, exponential sampling,
and localization.
For the purposes of this section, O˜(·) notation hides factors polynomial in log n and log(1/δ). Detailed
bounds are stated in Table 1.
Gradient descent-based algorithms. For (, δ)-differential privacy, we show that a noisy version of gra-
dient descent achieves excess risk O˜(
√
p/). This matches our lower bound, Ω(min(n,
√
p/)), up to log-
arithmic factors. (Note that every θ ∈ C has excess risk at most n, so a lower bound of n can always be
matched.) For ∆-strongly convex functions, a variant of our algorithm has risk O˜( p
∆n2
), which matches the
lower bound Ω( p
n2
) when ∆ is bounded below by a constant (recall that ∆ ≤ 2 since L = ‖C‖2 = 1).
Previously, the best known risk bounds were Ω(
√
pn/) for general convex functions and Ω( p√
n∆2
) for
∆-strongly convex functions (achievable via several different techniques (Chaudhuri et al. [11], Kifer et al.
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(, 0)-DP (, δ)-DP
Previous [11] This work Previous [34] This work
Assumptions Upper Bd Upper Bd Lower Bd Upper Bd Upper Bd Lower Bd
1-Lipschitz and
‖C‖2 = 1
p
√
n

p

p

√
p · n log(1/δ)

√
p log2(n/δ)

√
p

... and O(p)-smooth
p

p

√
p log(1/δ)

√
p

1-Lipschitz and ∆-
strongly convex and
‖C‖2 = 1 (implies
∆ ≤ 2)
p2√
n∆2
log(n)
∆
· p
2
n2
p2
n2
p log(1/δ)√
n∆2
log3(n/δ)
∆
· p
n2
p
n2
... and O(p)-smooth
p2
n∆2
p2
n2
p log(1/δ)
n∆2
p
n2
Table 1: Upper and lower bounds for excess risk of differentially-private convex ERM. Bounds ignore
leading multiplicative constants, and the values in the table give the bound when it is below n. That is, upper
bounds should be read as O(min(n, ...)) and lower bounds, as Ω(min(n, ...))). Here ‖C‖2 is the diameter
of C. The bounds are stated for the setting where L = ‖C‖2 = 1, which can be enforced by rescaling; to get
general statements, multiply the risk bounds by L‖C‖2, and replace ∆ by ∆‖C‖2L . We assume δ < 1/n to
simplify the bounds.
[34], Jain et al. [28], Duchi et al. [17])). Under the restriction that each data point’s contribution to the loss
function is sufficiently smooth, objective perturbation [11, 34] also has risk O˜(
√
p/) (which is tight, since
the lower bounds apply to smooth functions). However, smooth functions do not include important special
cases such as medians and support vector machines. Chaudhuri et al. [11] suggest applying their technique
to support vector machines by smoothing (“huberizing”) the loss function. We show in Appendix A that this
approach still yields expected excess risk Ω(
√
pn/).
Although straightforward noisy gradient descent would work well in our setting, we present a faster
variant based on stochastic gradient descent: At each step t, the algorithm samples a random point di from
the data set, computes a noisy version of di’s contribution to the gradient of L at the current estimate θ˜t, and
then uses that noisy measurement to update the parameter estimate. The algorithm is similar to algorithms
that have appeared previously (Williams and McSherry [49] first investigated gradient descent with noisy
updates; stochastic variants were studied by Jain et al. [28], Duchi et al. [17], Song et al. [46]). The novelty
of our analysis lies in taking advantage of the randomness in the choice of di (following Kasiviswanathan
et al. [31]) to run the algorithm for many steps without a significant cost to privacy. Running the algorithm
for T = n2 steps, gives the desired expected excess risk bound. Even nonprivate first-order algorithms—i.e.,
those based on gradient measurements—must learn information about the gradient at Ω(n2) points to get
risk bounds that are independent of n (this follows from “oracle complexity” bounds showing that 1/
√
T
convergence rate is optimal [39, 1]). Thus, the query complexity of our algorithm cannot be improved
without using more information about the loss function, such as second derivatives.
The gradient descent approach does not, to our knowledge, allow one to get optimal excess risk bounds
for (, 0)-differential privacy. The main obstacle is that “strong composition” of (, δ)-privacy Dwork et al.
[22] appears necessary to allow a first-order method to run for sufficiently many steps.
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Exponential Sampling-based Algorithms. For (, 0)-differential privacy, we observe that a straightforward
use of the exponential mechanism — sampling from an appropriately-sized net of points in C, where each
point θ has probability proportional to exp(−L(θ;D)) — has excess risk O˜(p/) on general Lipschitz
functions, nearly matching the lower bound of Ω(p/). (The bound would not be optimal for (, δ)-privacy
because it scales as p, not
√
p). This mechanism is inefficient in general since it requires construction of a
net and an appropriate sampling mechanism.
We give a polynomial time algorithm that achieves the optimal excess risk, namelyO(p/). Note that the
achieved excess risk does not have any logarithmic factors which is shown to be the case using a “peeling-”
type argument that is specific to convex functions. The idea of our algorithm is to sample efficiently from
the continuous distribution on all points in C with density P(θ) ∝ e−L(θ). Although the distribution we
hope to sample from is log-concave, standard techniques do not work for our purposes: existing methods
converge only in statistical difference, whereas we require a multiplicative convergence guarantee to provide
(, 0)-differential privacy. Previous solutions to this issue (Hardt and Talwar [25]) worked for the uniform
distribution, but not for general log-concave distributions.
The problem comes from the combination of an arbitrary convex set and an arbitrary (Lipschitz) loss
function defining P . We circumvent this issue by giving an algorithm that samples from an appropriately
defined distribution P˜ on a cube containing C, such that (i) the algorithm outputs a point in C with constant
probability, and (ii) P˜ , conditioned on sampling from C, is within multiplicative distance O() from the
correct distribution. We use, as a subroutine, the random walk on grid points of the cube of [2].
Localization: Optimal Algorithms for Strongly Convex Functions. The exponential-sampling-based
technique discussed above does not take advantage of strong convexity of the loss function. We show,
however, that a novel combination of two standard techniques—the exponential mechanism and Laplace-
noise-based output perturbation—does yield an optimal algorithm. Chaudhuri et al. [11] and [41] showed
that strongly convex functions have low-sensitivity minimizers, and hence that one can release the minimum
of a strongly convex function with Laplace noise (with total Euclidean length about ρ = p∆n if each loss
function is ∆-strongly convex). Simply using this first estimate as a candidate output does not yield optimal
utility in general; instead it gives a risk bound of roughly p∆ .
The main insight is that this first estimate defines us a small neighborhood C0 ⊆ C, of radius about ρ,
that contains the true minimizer. Running the exponential mechanism in this small set improves the excess
risk bound by a factor of about ρ over running the same mechanism on all of C. The final risk bound is then
O˜(ρ pn) = O˜(
p2
∆2n
), which matches the lower bound of Ω( p
2
2n
) when ∆ = Ω(1). This simple “localization”
idea is not needed for (, δ)-privacy, since the gradient descent method can already take advantage of strong
convexity to converge more quickly.
Lower Bounds. We use techniques developed to bound the accuracy of releasing 1-way marginals (due to
Hardt and Talwar [25] for (, 0)− and Bun et al. [8] for (, δ)-privacy) to show that our algorithms have
essentially optimal risk bounds. The instances that arise in our lower bounds are simple: the functions can
be linear (or quadratic, for the case of strong convexity) and the constraint set C can be either the unit ball
or the hypercube. In particular, our lower bounds apply to special case of smooth functions, demonstrating
the optimality of objective perturbation [11, 34] in that setting. The reduction to lower-bounds for 1-way
marginals is not quite black-box; we exploit specific properties of the instances used by Hardt and Talwar
[25], Bun et al. [8].
Finally, we provide a much stronger lower bound on the utility of a specific algorithm, the Huberization-
based algorithm proposed by Chaudhuri et al. [11] for support vector machines. In order to apply their
algorithm to nonsmooth loss functions, they proposed smoothing the loss function by Huberization, and
then running their algorithm (which requires smoothness for the privacy analysis) on the resulting, modified
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loss functions. We show that for any setting of the Huerization parameters, there are simple, one-dimensional
nonsmooth loss functions for which the algorithm has error Ω(n). This bound justifies the effort we put into
designing new algorithms for nonsmooth loss functions.
Generalization Error. In Appendix F, we discuss the implications of our results for generalization error.
Specifically, suppose that the data are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution τ , and let ExcessRisk(θ) denote the
expected loss of θ on unseen data from τ , that is ExcessRisk(θ) = Ed∼τ [`(θ; d)].
For an important class of loss functions, called generalized linear models, the straightforward applica-
tion of our algorithms gives generalization error O˜
(
min
(
1√
n
, p
c
n
))
where c = 1 for the case of (, 0)-
differential privacy, and c = 2 for (, δ)-differential privacy (assuming log(1/δ) = O(log n)). This bound
is tight: the 1√
n
is necessary even in the nonprivate setting, and the necessity of the p
c
n term follows from
our lower bounds on excess empirical risk (they are also lower bounds on generalization error).
For the case of general Lipschitz convex functions, a modification of our algorithms gives excess risk
O˜
(
pc
′
√
n
)
, where c′ = 12 for (, 0)-differential privacy and c
′ = 14 for (, δ) differential privacy (that is, the
generalization error bound is roughly the square root of the corresponding empirical error bound). The best
known lower bound, however, is the same as for the special case of generalized linear models. The bounds
match when p ≈ n (in which case no nontrivial generalization error is possible). However, for smaller
values of p there remains a gap that is polynomial in p. Closing the gap is an interesting open problem.
1.2 Other Related Work
In addition to the previous work mentioned above, we mention several closely related works. A rich line of
work seeks to characterize the optimal error of differentially private algorithms for learning and optimization
Kasiviswanathan et al. [31], Beimel et al. [3], Chaudhuri and Hsu [9], Beimel et al. [4, 5]. In particular, our
results on (, 0)-differential privacy imply nearly-tight bounds on the “representation dimension” Beimel
et al. [5] of convex Lipschitz functions.
Jain and Thakurta [27] gave dimension-independent expected excess risk bounds for the special case
of “generalized linear models” with a strongly convex regularizer, assuming that C = Rp (that is, uncon-
strained optimization). Kifer et al. [34], Smith and Thakurta [45] considered parameter convergence for
high-dimensional sparse regression (where p  n). The settings of those papers are orthogonal to ours,
though a common generalization would be interesting.
Efficient implementations of the exponential mechanism over infinite domains were discussed by Hardt
and Talwar [25], Chaudhuri et al. [12] and Kapralov and Talwar [29]. The latter two works were specific to
sampling (approximately) singular vectors of a matrix, and their techniques do not obviously apply here.
Differentially private convex learning in different models has also been studied: for example, Jain et al.
[28], Duchi et al. [17], Smith and Thakurta [44] study online optimization, Jain and Thakurta [26] study an
interactive model tailored to high-dimensional kernel learning. Convex optimization techniques have also
played an important role in the development of algorithms for “simultaneous query release” (e.g., the line
of work emerging from Hardt and Rothblum [24]). We do not know of a direct connection between those
works and our setting.
1.3 Additional Definitions
For completeness, we state a few additional definitions related to convex sets and functions.
• ` : C → R is L-Lipschitz (in the Euclidean norm) if, for all pairs x, y ∈ C, we have |`(x) − `(y)| ≤
5
L‖x− y‖2. A subgradient of a convex ` function at x, denoted ∂`(x), is the set of vectors z such that
for all y ∈ C, `(y) ≥ `(x) + 〈z, y − x〉.
• ` is ∆-strongly convex on C if, for all x ∈ C, for all subgradients z at x, and for all y ∈ C, we have
`(y) ≥ `(x) + 〈z, y−x〉+ ∆2 ‖y−x‖22 (i.e., ` is bounded below by a quadratic function tangent at x).
• ` is β-smooth on C if, for all x ∈ C, for all subgradients z at x and for all y ∈ C, we have `(y) ≤
`(x) + 〈z, y − x〉 + β2 ‖y − x‖22 (i.e., ` is bounded above by a quadratic function tangent at x).
Smoothness implies differentiability, so the subgradient at x is unique.
• Given a convex set C, we denote its diameter by ‖C‖2. We denote the projection of any vector θ ∈ Rp
to the convex set C by ΠC(θ) = arg min
x∈C
‖θ − x‖2.
1.4 Organization of this Paper
Our upper bounds (efficient algorithms) are given in Sections 2, 3, and 4, whereas our lower bounds are
given in Section 5. Namely, in Section 2, we give efficient construction for (, δ)-differentially private
algorithms for general convex loss as well as Lipschitz strongly convex loss. In Section 3, we discuss a pure
-differentially private algorithm for general Lipschitz convex loss and outline an efficient construction for
such algorithm. In Section 4, we discuss our localization technique and show how to construct efficient pure
-differentially private algorithms for Lipschitz strongly convex loss. We derive our lower bound for general
Lipschitz convex loss in Section 5.1 and our lower bound for Lipschitz strongly convex loss in Section 5.2.
In Section 6, we discuss a generic construction of an efficient algorithm for sampling (with a multiplicative
distance guarantee) from a logconcave distribution over an arbitrary convex bounded set. As a by-product
of our generic construction, we give the details of the construction of our efficient -differentially private
algorithm from Section 3.2.
The appendices contain proof details and supplementary material: Appendix A shows that smoothing
a nonsmooth loss function in order to apply the objective perturbation technique of Chaudhuri et al. [11]
can introduce significant additional error. Appendix B gives details on the application of localization in
the setting of (, δ)-differential privacy. Appendix C provides additional details on the proofs of lower
bounds. In Appendix D, we explain standard modifications that allow our algorithms to give high probability
guarantees instead of expected risk guarantees. Finally, in Appendix F we discuss the how our algorithms
can be adapted to provide guarantees on generalization error, rather than empirical error.
2 Gradient Descent and Optimal (, δ)-differentially private Optimization
In this section we provide an algorithmANoise−GD (Algorithm 1) for computing θpriv using a noisy stochas-
tic variant of the classic gradient descent algorithm from the optimization literature [7]. Our algorithm (and
the utility analysis) was inspired by the approach of Williams and McSherry [49] for logistic regression.
All the excess risk bounds (16) in this section and the rest of this paper, are presented in expectation
over the randomness of the algorithm. In Section D we provide a generic tool to translate the expectation
bounds into high probability bound albeit at a loss of extra logarithmic factor in the inverse of the failure
probability.
Note(1): The results in this section do not require the loss function ` to be differentiable. Although we
present Algorithm ANoise−GD (and its analysis) using the gradient of the loss function `(θ; d) at θ, the same
guarantees hold if instead of the gradient, the algorithm is run with any sub-gradient of ` at θ.
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Note(2): Instead of using the stochastic variant in Algorithm 1, one can use the complete gradient (i.e.,
5L(θ;D)) in Step 5 and still have the same utility guarantee as Theorem 2.4. However, the running time
goes up by a factor of n.
Algorithm 1 ANoise−GD: Differentially Private Gradient Descent
Input: Data set: D = {d1, · · · , dn}, loss function ` (with Lipschitz constant L), privacy parameters (, δ),
convex set C, and the learning rate function η : [n2]→ R.
1: Set noise variance σ2 ← 32L2n2 log(n/δ) log(1/δ)
2
.
2: θ˜1 : Choose any point from C.
3: for t = 1 to n2 − 1 do
4: Pick d ∼u D with replacement.
5: θ˜t+1 = ΠC
(
θ˜t − η(t)
[
n5 `(θ˜t; d) + bt
])
, where bt ∼ N
(
0, Ipσ2
)
.
6: Output θpriv = θ˜n2 .
Theorem 2.1 (Privacy guarantee). Algorithm ANoise−GD (Algorithm 1) is (, δ)-differentially private.
Proof. At any time step t ∈ [n2] in AlgorithmANoise−GD, fix the randomness due to sampling in Line 4. Let
Xt(D) = n5`(θ˜t; d)+bt be a random variable defined over the randomness of bt and conditioned on θ˜t (see
Line 5 for a definition), where d ∈ D is the data point picked in Line 4. Denote µXt(D)(y) to be the measure
of the random variable Xt(D) induced on y ∈ R. For any two neighboring data sets D and D′, define the
privacy loss random variable [22] to be Wt =
∣∣∣log µXt(D)(Xt(D))µXt(D′)(Xt(D))
∣∣∣. Standard differential privacy arguments
for Gaussian noise addition (see [34, 40]) will ensure that with probability 1− δ2 (over the randomness of the
random variables bt’s and conditioned on the randomness due to sampling),Wt ≤ 
2
√
log(1/δ)
for all t ∈ [n2].
Now using the following lemma (Lemma 2.2 with ′ = 
2
√
log(1/δ)
and γ = 1/n) we ensure that over the
randomness of bt’s and the randomness due to sampling in Line 4 , w.p. at least 1− δ2 , Wt ≤ n√log(1/δ) for
all t ∈ [n2]. While using Lemma 2.2, we ensure that the condition 
2
√
log(1/δ)
≤ 1 is satisfied.
Lemma 2.2 (Privacy amplification via sampling. Lemma 4 in [3]). Over a domain of data sets T n, if an
algorithmA is ′ ≤ 1 differentially private, then for any data setD ∈ T n, executingA on uniformly random
γn entries of D ensures 2γ′-differential privacy.
To conclude the proof, we apply “strong composition” (Lemma 2.3) from [22]. With probability at least
1− δ, the privacy loss W =
n2∑
t=1
Wt is at most . This concludes the proof.
Lemma 2.3 (Strong composition [22]). Let , δ′ ≥ 0. The class of -differentially private algorithms satisfies
(′, δ′)-differential privacy under T -fold adaptive composition for ′ =
√
2T ln(1/δ′)+ T(e − 1).
In the following we provide the utility guarantees for AlgorithmANoise−GD under two different settings,
namely, when the function ` is Lipschitz, and when the function ` is Lipschitz and strongly convex. In
Section 5 we argue that these excess risk bounds are essentially tight.
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Theorem 2.4 (Utility guarantee). Let σ2 = O
(
L2n2 log(n/δ) log(1/δ)
2
)
. For θpriv output by Algorithm
ANoise−GD we have the following. (The expectation is over the randomness of the algorithm.)
1. Lipschitz functions: If we set the learning rate function η(t) = ‖C‖2√
t(n2L2+pσ2)
, then we have the
following excess risk bound. Here L is the Lipscthiz constant of the loss function `.
E
[L(θpriv;D)− L(θ∗;D)] = O(L‖C‖2 log3/2(n/δ)√p log(1/δ)

)
.
2. Lipschitz and strongly convex functions: If we set the learning rate function η(t) = 1∆nt , then we
have the following excess risk bound. Here L is the Lipscthiz constant of the loss function ` and ∆ is
the strong convexity parameter.
E
[L(θpriv;D)− L(θ∗;D)] = O(L2 log2(n/δ)p log(1/δ)
n∆2
)
.
Proof. Let Gt = n5 `(θ˜t; d) + bt in Line 5 of Algorithm 1. First notice that over the randomness of the
sampling of the data entry d from D, and the randomness of bt, E [Gt] = 5L(θ˜t;D). Additionally, we have
the following bound on E[‖Gt‖22].
E[‖Gt‖22] = n2E[‖ 5 `(θ˜t; d)‖22] + 2nE[〈5`(θ˜t; d), bt〉] + E[‖bt‖22]
≤ n2L2 + pσ2 [Here σ2 is the variance of bt in Line 5] (2)
In the above expression we have used the fact that since θ˜t is independent of bt, so E[〈5`(θ˜t; d), bt〉] = 0.
Also, we have E[‖bt‖22] = pσ2. We can now directly use Lemma 2.5 to obtain the required error guarantee
for Lipschitz convex functions, and Lemma 2.6 for Lipschitz and strongly convex functions.
Lemma 2.5 (Theorem 2 from [43]). Let F (θ) (for θ ∈ C) be a convex function and let θ∗ = arg min
θ∈C
F (θ).
Let θ1 be any arbitrary point from C. Consider the stochastic gradient descent algorithm θt+1 = ΠC [θt − η(t)Gt(θt)],
where E[Gt(θt)] = 5F (θt), E[‖Gt‖22] ≤ G2 and the learning rate function η(t) = ‖C‖2G√t . Then for any
T > 1, the following is true.
E [F (θT )− F (θ∗)] = O
(‖C‖2G log T√
T
)
.
Using the bound from (2) in Lemma 2.5 (i.e., set G =
√
n2L2 + pσ2), and setting T = n2 and the
learning rate function η(t) as in Lemma 2.5, gives us the required excess risk bound for Lipschitz convex
functions. For Lipschitz and strongly convex functions we use the following result by [43].
Lemma 2.6 (Theorem 1 from [43]). Let F (θ) (for θ ∈ C) be a λ-strongly convex function and let θ∗ =
arg min
θ∈C
F (θ). Let θ1 be any arbitrary point from C. Consider the stochastic gradient descent algorithm
θt+1 = ΠC [θt − η(t)Gt(θt)], where E[Gt(θt)] = 5F (θt), E[‖Gt‖22] ≤ G2 and the learning rate function
η(t) = 1λt . Then for any T > 1, the following is true.
E [F (θT )− F (θ∗)] = O
(
G2 log T
λT
)
.
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Using the bound from (2) in Lemma 2.6 (i.e., set G =
√
n2L2 + pσ2), λ = n∆, and setting T = n2
and the learning rate function η(t) as in Lemma 2.6, gives us the required excess risk bound for Lipschitz
and strongly convex convex functions.
Note: Algorithm ANoise−GD has a running time of O(pn2), assuming that the gradient computation for `
takes time O(p). Variants of Algorithm ANoise−GD have appeared in [49, 28, 17, 47]. The most relevant
work in our current context is that of [47]. The main idea in [47] is to run stochastic gradient descent
with gradients computed over small batches of disjoint samples from the data set (as opposed to one single
sample used in Algorithm ANoise−GD). The issue with the algorithm is that it cannot provide excess risk
guarantee which is o(
√
n), where n is the number of data samples. One observation that we make is that
if one removes the constraint of disjointness and use the amplification lemma (Lemma 2.2), then one can
ensure a much tighter privacy guarantees for the same setting of parameters used in the paper.
3 Exponential Sampling and Optimal (, 0)-private Optimization
In this section, we focus on the case of pure -differential privacy and provide an optimal efficient algorithm
for empirical risk minimization for the general class of convex and Lipschitz loss functions. The main
building block of this section is the well-known exponential mechanism [37].
First, we show that a variant of the exponential mechanism is optimal. A major technical contribu-
tion of this section is to make the exponential mechanism computationally efficient which is discussed in
Section 3.2.
3.1 Exponential Mechanism for Lipschitz Convex Loss
In this section we only deal with loss functions which are Lipschitz. We provide an -differentially private
algorithm (Algorithm 2) which achieves the optimal excess risk for arbitrary convex bounded sets.
Algorithm 2 Aexp−samp: Exponential sampling based convex optimization
Input: Data set of size n: D, loss function `, privacy parameter  and convex set C.
1: L(θ;D) =
n∑
i=1
`(θ; di).
2: Sample a point θpriv from the convex set C w.p. proportional to exp
(
− 2L‖C‖2L(θ;D)
)
and output.
Theorem 3.1 (Privacy guarantee). Algorithm 2 is -differentially private.
Proof. First, notice that the distribution induced by the exponential weight function in step 2 of Algorithm 2
is the same if we use exp
(
− L‖C‖2 (L(θ;D)− L(θ0;D))
)
for some arbitrary point θ0 ∈ C. Since ` is L-
Lipschitz, the sensitivity of L(θ;D)− L(θ0;D) is at most L‖C‖2. The proof then follows directly from the
analysis of exponential mechanism by [37].
In the following we prove the utility guarantee for Algorithm Aexp−samp.
Theorem 3.2 (Utility guarantee). Let θpriv be the output of Aexp−samp (Algorithm 2 above). Then, we
have the following guarantee on the expected excess risk. (The expectation is over the randomness of the
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Figure 1: Differential cone Ω inside the convex set C
algorithm.)
E
[L(θpriv;D)− L(θ∗;D)] = O(pL‖C‖2

)
.
Proof. Consider a differential cone Ω centered at θ∗ (see Figure 1). We will bound the expected excess risk
of θpriv by O
(
pL‖C‖2

)
conditioned on θpriv ∈ Ω ∩ C for every differential cone. This immediately implies
the above theorem by the properties of conditional expectation.
Let Γ be a fixed threshold (to be set later) and let R(θ) = L(θpriv;D) − L(θ∗;D) for the purposes of
brevity. Let the marked sets Ai’s in Figure 1 be defined as
Ai = {θ ∈ Ω ∩ C : (i− 1)Γ ≤ R(θ) ≤ i · Γ}.
Instead of directly computing the probability of θpriv being outside A1, we will analyze the probabilities for
being in each of the Ai’s individually. This form of “peeling” arguments have been used for risk analysis
of convex loss in the machine learning literature (e.g., see [48]) and will allow us to get rid of the extra
logarithmic factor that would have otherwise shown up in the excess risk if we use the standard analysis of
the exponential mechanism in [37].
Since Ω is a differential cone and since R(θ) is continuous on C, it follows that within Ω ∩ C, R(θ) only
depends on ‖θ − θ∗‖2. Therefore, let r1, r2, · · · be the distance of the set boundaries of A1, A2, · · · from
θ∗. (See Figure 1.) One can equivalently write each Ai as follows:
Ai = {θ ∈ Ω ∩ C : ri−1 < ‖θ − θ∗‖2 ≤ ri}.
The following claim is the key part of the proof.
Claim 3.3. Convexity of R(θ) for all θ ∈ C implies that ri − ri−1 ≤ ri−1 − ri−2 for all i ≥ 3.
Proof. Since by definition θ∗ is the minimizer of R(θ) within C and R(θ) is convex, we have R(θ2) ≥ R(θ1)
for any θ1, θ2 ∈ C ∩ Ω such that ‖θ2 − θ∗‖2 ≥ ‖θ1 − θ∗‖2. This directly implies the required bound.
Now, the volume of the set Ai is given by Vol(Ai) = κ
ri∫
ri−1
rp−1dr for some fixed constant κ. Hence,
Vol(Ai)
Vol(A2)
=
rpi−1
rp1
· (ri/ri−1)
p − 1
(r2/r1)p − 1 ≤
rpi−1
rp1
≤ (i− 1)p.
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where the last two inequalities follows from Claim 3.3. Hence, we get the following bound on the probability
that the excess risk R(θpriv) ≥ 4Γ conditioned on θpriv ∈ C ∩ Ω (For brevity, we remove the conditioning
sign from the probabilities below).
Pr[R(θpriv) ≥ 4Γ] ≤
Pr[θpriv ∈
∞⋃
i=4
Ai]
Pr[θpriv ∈ A2] ≤
∞∑
i=4
Vol(Ai)
Vol(A2)
· e−(i−3) Γ2L‖C‖2 ≤
∞∑
i=4
(i− 1)p · e−(i−3) Γ2L‖C‖2
≤ 3
pe
− Γ
2L‖C‖2
1− 2pe− Γ2L‖C‖2
where the last inequality follows from the fact that (i−1)p ≤ 3p ·(2i−4)p for i ≥ 4. Hence, for every t > 0,
if we choose Γ = 2L‖C‖2 ((p+ 1) ln 3 + t), then, conditioned on θ
priv ∈ C ∩ Ω, we get
Pr[R(θpriv) ≥ 8L‖C‖2

((p+ 1) ln 3 + t)] ≤ e−t.
Since this is true for every t > 0, we have our required bound as a corollary.
3.2 Efficient Implementation of Algorithm Aexp−samp (Algorithm 2)
In this section, we give a high-level description of a computationally efficient construction of Algorithm
2. Our algorithm runs in polynomial time in n, p and outputs a sample θ ∈ C from a distribution that is
arbitrarily close (in the multiplicative sense) to the distribution of the output of Algorithm 2.
Since we are interested in an efficient pure -differentially private algorithm, we need an efficient sampler
with a multiplicative distance guarantee. In fact, if we were interested in (, δ) algorithms, efficient sampling
with a total variation guarantee would have sufficed which would have made our task a lot easier as we could
have used one of the exisiting algorithms, e.g., [36]. In [25], it was shown how to sample efficiently with a
multiplicative guarantee from the unifrom distribution over a convex bounded set. However, what we want
to achieve here is more general, that is, to sample efficiently from any given logconcave distribution defined
over a convex bounded set. To the best of our knowledge, this task has not been explicitly worked out before,
nevertheless, all the ingredients needed to accomplish it are present in the literature, mainly [2].
We highlight here the main ideas of our constrution. Since such construction is not specific to our privacy
problem and could be of independent interest, in this section, we only provide the high-level description of
this construction, however all the details of such construction and the proof of our main result (Theorem 3.4
below) are deferred to Section 6.
Theorem 3.4. There is an efficient version of Algorithm 2 that has the following guarantees.
1. Privacy: The algorithm is  -differentially private.
2. Utility: The output θpriv ∈ C of the algorithm satisfies
E
[L(θpriv;D)− L(θ∗;D)] = O(pL‖C‖2

)
.
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3. Running time: Assuming C is in isotropic position, the algorithm runs in time1
O
(‖C‖22p3n3 max {p log(‖C‖2pn), ‖C‖2n}) .
In fact, the running time of our algorithm depends on ‖C‖∞ rather than ‖C‖2. Namely, all the ‖C‖2
terms in the running time can be replaced with ‖C‖∞, however, we chose to write it in this less conservative
way since all the bounds in this paper are expressed in terms of ‖C‖2.
Before describing our construction, we first introduce some useful notation and discuss some prelimi-
naries.
For any two probability measures µ, ν defined with respect to the same sample space Q ⊆ Rp, the
relative (multiplicative) distance between µ and ν, denoted as Dist∞(µ, ν) is defined as
Dist∞(µ, ν) = sup
q∈Q
∣∣∣∣log dµ(q)dν(q)
∣∣∣∣ .
where dµ(q)dν(q) (resp.,
dν(q)
dµ(q) ) denotes the ratio of the two measures (more precisely, the Radon-Nikodym deriva-
tive).
Assumptions: We assume that we can efficiently test whether a given point θ ∈ Rp lies in C using a mem-
bership oracle. We also assume that we can efficienly optimize an efficiently computable convex function
over a convex set. To do this, it suffices to have a projection oracle. We do not take into account the extra
polynomial factor in the running time which is required to perform such operations since this factor is highly
dependent on the specific structure of the set C.
When C is not isotropic: In Theorem 3.4 and in the rest of this section, we assume that C is in isotropic
position. In particular, we assume that B ⊆ C ⊆ pB. However, if the convex set is not in isotropic position,
fortunately, we know of efficient algorithms for placing it in isotropic position (for example, the algorithm
of [35]). In such case, the first step of our algorithm would be to transform C to an isotropic position (and
apply the corresponding transformation to the loss function). This step takes time polynomial in p with
additional polylog factor in 1r where r > 0 is the diameter of the largest ball we can fit inside C (See [35]
and [23]). Specifically, if r = Ω(1), then our set C would be already in isotropic position. Then, we sample
efficiently from the transformed set. Finally, we apply the inverse transformation to the output sample to
obtain a sample from the desired distribution over C in its original position. In the worst case, the isotropic
transformation can amplify the diameter of C by a factor of p. Putting all this together, the running time in
Theorem 3.4 above will pick up an extra factor of O
(
max
(
p3, polylog
(
1
r
)))
in the worst case if C is not in
isotropic position.
3.3 Our construction
Let τ denote the L∞ diameter of C. The Minkowski’s norm of θ ∈ Rp with respect to C, denoted as ψ(θ),
is defined as ψ(θ) = inf{r > 0 : θ ∈ rC}. We define ψ¯α(θ) , α ·max{0, ψ(θ)− 1} for α > 0. Note that
ψ¯α(θ) > 0 if and only if θ /∈ C. Moreover, it is not hard to verify that ψ¯α is α-Lipschitz.
We use the grid-walk algorithm of [2] for sampling from a logconcave distribution defined over a cube
as a building block. Our construction is described as follows:
1. Enclose the set C with a cube A with edges of length τ .
1The case where C is not in isotropic position is discussed below.
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2. Obtain a convex Lipschitz extension L¯(.;D) of the loss function L(.;D) over A. This can be done
efficiently using a projection oracle.
3. Define F (θ) , e−

6L‖C‖2 L¯(θ;D)−ψ¯α(θ), θ ∈ A, for a specific choice of α = O( n‖C‖2 ) (See Section 6
for details).
4. Run the grid-walk algorithm of [2] with F as the input weight function and A as the input cube, and
output a sample θ whose distribution is close, with respect to Dist∞, to the distribution induced by F
on A which is given by F (θ)∫
v∈A
F (v)dv
, θ ∈ A.
Now, note that what we have so far is an efficient procedure (let’s denote it by Acube−samp) that outputs
a sample from a distribution over A which close, with respect to Dist∞, to the continuous distribution
F (u)∫
v∈A
F (v)dv
, u ∈ A. We then argue that due to the choices made for the values of the parameters above,
Acube−samp outputs a sample in C with probability at least 12 . That is, the algorithm succeeds to output a
sample from a distribution close to the right distribution on C with probability at least 1/2. Hence, we can
amplify the probability of success by repeating Acube−samp sufficiently many times where fresh random
coins are used by Acube−samp in every time (specifically, O(n) iterations would suffice). If Acube−samp
returns a sample θ ∈ C in one of those iterations, then our algorithm terminates outputting θ. Otherwise,
it outputs a uniformly random sample θ⊥ from the unit ball B (Note that B ⊆ C since C is in isotropic
position). We finally show that this termination condition can only change the distribution of the output
sample by a constant factor sufficiently close to 1. Hence, we obtain our efficient algorithm referred to in
Theorem 3.4.
4 Localization and Optimal Private Algorithms for Strongly Convex Loss
It is unclear how to get a direct variant of Algorithm 2 in Section 3 for Lipschitz and strongly convex losses
that can achieve optimal excess risk guarantees. The issue in extending Algorithm 2 directly is that the
convex set C over which the exponential mechanism is defined is “too large” to provide tight guarantees.
We show a generic -differentially private algorithm for minimizing Lipschitz strongly convex loss func-
tions based on a combination of a simple pre-processing step (called the localization step) and any generic
-differentially private algorithm for Lipschitz convex loss functions. We carry out the localization step us-
ing a simple output perturbation algorithm which ensures that the convex set over which the -differentially
private algorithm (in the second step) is run has diameter O˜(p/n).
Next, we instantiate the generic -differentially private algorithm in the second step with our efficient
exponential mechanism of Section3.1 (Algorithm 2) to obtain an algorithm with optimal excess risk bound
(Theorem 4.3).
Note: The localization technique is not specific to pure -differential privacy, and extends naturally to (, δ)
case. Although it is not relevant in our current context, since we already have gradient descent based
algorithm which achieves optimal excess risk bound. We defer the details for the (, δ) case to Appendix B.
Details of the generic algorithm: We first give a simple algorithm that carries out the desired localization
step. The crux of the algorithm is the same as to that of the output perturbation algorithm of [10, 11]. The
high-level idea is to first compute θ∗ = arg min
θ∈C
L(θ;D) and add noise according to the sensitivity of θ∗.
The details of the algorithm are given in Algorithm 3.
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Algorithm 3 Aout−pert: Output Perturbation for Strongly Convex Loss
Input: data set of size n: D, loss function `, strong convexity parameter ∆, privacy parameter , convex set
C, and radius parameter ζ < 1.
1: L(θ;D) =
n∑
i=1
`(θ; di).
2: Find θ∗ = arg min
θ∈C
L(θ;D).
3: θ0 = ΠC (θ∗ + b), where b is random noise vector with density 1αe
−n∆
2L
‖b‖2 (where α is a normalizing
constant) and ΠC is the projection on to the convex set C.
4: Output C0 = {θ ∈ C : ‖θ − θ0‖2 ≤ ζ 2Lp∆n}.
Having Algorithm 3 in hand, we now give a generic -differentially private algorithm for minimizing L
over C. Let Agen−Lip denote any generic -differentially private algorithm for optimizing L over some arbi-
trary convex set C˜ ⊆ C. Algorithm 2 from Section 3.1 or its efficient version Algorithm 7(See Theorem 3.4
and Section 6 for details) is an example of Agen−Lip. The algorithm we present here (Algorithm 4 below)
makes a black-box call in its first step to A

2
out−pert (Algorithm 3 shown above), then, in the second step, it
feeds the output of A

2
out−pert into A

2
gen−Lip and ouptut.
Algorithm 4 Output-perturbation-based Generic Algorithm
Input: data set of size n: D, loss function `, strong convexity parameter ∆, privacy parameter , and convex
set C.
1: Run A

2
out−pert (Algorithm 3) with input privacy parameter /2, radius parameter ζ = 3 log (n) and
output C0.
2: Run A

2
gen−Lip on inputs n,D, `, privacy parameter /2, and convex set C0, and output θpriv.
Theorem 4.1 (Privacy guarantee). Algorithm 4 is -differentially private.
Proof. The privacy guarantee follows directly from the composition theorem together with the fact that
A

2
out−pert is

2 -differentially private (see [11]) and that A

2
gen−Lip is

2 -differentially private by assumption.
In the following theorem, we provide a generic expression for the excess risk of Algorithm 4 in terms of
the expected excess risk of any given algorithm Agen−Lip.
Lemma 4.2 (Generic utility guarantee). Let θ˜ denote the output of AlgorithmAgen−Lip on inputs n,D, `, , C˜
(for an arbitrary convex set C˜ ⊆ C). Let θˆ denote the minimizer of L(.;D) over C˜. If
E
[
L(θ˜;D)− L(θˆ;D)
]
≤ F
(
p, n, , L, ‖C˜‖2
)
for some function F , then the output θpriv of Algorithm 4 satisfies
E
[L(θpriv;D)− L(θ∗;D)] = O(F (p, n, , L,O(Lp log(n)
∆n
)))
,
where θ∗ = arg min
θ∈C
L(θ;D).
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Proof. The proof follows from the fact that, in Algorithm A

2
out−pert, the norm of the noise vector ‖b‖2 is
distributed according to Gamma distribution Γ(p, 4L∆n) and hence satisfies
Pr
(
‖b‖2 ≤ ζ 4Lp
∆n
)
≥ 1− e−ζ
(see, for example, [11]). Now, set ζ = 3 log(n). Hence, with probability 1− 1
n3
, C0 (the output ofA

2
out−pert)
contains θ∗. Hence, by setting C˜ in the statement of the lemma to C0 (and noting that ‖C0‖2 = O
(
Lp log(n)
∆n
)
),
then conditioned on the event that C0 contains θ∗, we have θˆ = θ∗ and hence
E
[L(θpriv;D)− L(θ∗;D) |θ∗ ∈ C0] ≤ F (p, n, , L,O(Lp log(n)
∆n
))
Thus,
E
[L(θpriv;D)− L(θ∗;D)] ≤ F (p, n, , L,O(Lp log(n)
∆n
))
(1− 1
n3
) + nL‖C‖2 1
n3
Note that the second term on the right-hand side above becomes O( 1
n2
). From our lower bound (Section 5.2
below), F (., n, ., ., .) must be at least Ω( 1n). Hence, we have
E
[L(θpriv;D)− L(θ∗;D)] = O(F (p, n, , L,O(Lp log(n)
∆n
)))
which completes the proof of the theorem.
Instantiation of Algorithm A

2
gen−Lip with the exponential sampling algorithm: Next, we give our optimal
-differentially private algorithm for Lipschitz strongly convex loss functions. To do this, we instantiate
the generic Algorithm Agen−Lip in Algorithm 4 with our exponential sampling algorithm from Section 3.1
(Algorithm 2), or its efficient version AlgorithmAeff−exp−samp (See Section 3.2) to obtain the optimal excess
risk bound. We formally state the bound in Theorem 4.3) below. The proof of Theorem 4.3 follows from
Theorem 3.2 and Lemma 4.2 above.
Theorem 4.3 (Utility guarantee with Algorithm 7 as an instantiation of Agen−Lip). Suppose we replace
A

2
gen−Lip in Algorithm 4 with Algorithm 2 (Section 3.1), or its efficient version Algorithm 7 (See Theorem 3.4
and Section 6 for details). Then, the output θpriv satisfies
E
[L(θpriv;D)− L(θ∗;D)] = O( p2L2
n∆2
log(n)
)
where θ∗ = arg min
θ∈C
L(θ;D).
5 Lower Bounds on Excess Risk
In this section, we complete the picture by deriving lower bounds on the excess risk caused by differentially
private algorithm for risk minimization. As before, for a dataset D = {d1, . . . , dn}, our decomposable loss
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function is expressed as L(θ;D) =
n∑
i=1
`(θ; di), θ ∈ C for some convex set C ⊂ Rp. In Section 5.1, we
consider the case of convex Lipschitz loss functions, whereas in Section 5.2, we consider the case of strongly
convex and Lipschitz loss functions.
Before we state and prove our lower bounds, we first give the following useful lemma which gives lower
bounds on the L2-error incurred by  and (, δ)-differentially private algorithms for estimating the 1-way
marginals of datasets over {− 1√p , 1√p}p. This lemma is based on the results of [25] and [8], however, for the
sake of completeness, we give a detailed proof of this lemma in Appendix C.
Lemma 5.1 (Lower bounds for 1-way marginals).
1. -differential private algorithms: Let n, p ∈ N and  > 0. There is a number M = Ω (min (n, p/))
such that for every -differentially private algorithm A, there is a dataset D = {d1, . . . , dn} ⊆
{− 1√p , 1√p}p with ‖
∑n
i=1 di‖2 ∈ [M − 1,M + 1] such that, with probability at least 1/2 (taken over
the algorithm random coins), we have
‖A(D)− q(D)‖2 = Ω
(
min
(
1,
p
n
))
where q(D) = 1n
∑n
i=1 di.
2. (, δ)-differential private algorithms: Let n, p ∈ N,  > 0, and δ = o( 1n). There is a number M =
Ω
(
min
(
n,
√
p/
))
such that for every (, δ)-differentially private algorithm A, there is a dataset
D = {d1, . . . , dn} ⊆ {− 1√p , 1√p}p with ‖
∑n
i=1 di‖2 ∈ [M − 1,M + 1] such that, with probability
at least 1/3 (taken over the algorithm random coins), we have
l‖A(D)− q(D)‖2 = Ω
(
min
(
1,
√
p
n
))
where q(D) = 1n
∑n
i=1 di.
5.1 Lower bounds for Lipschitz Convex Functions
In this section, we give lower bounds for both  and (, δ) differentially private algorithms for minimizing
any convex Lipschitz loss function L(θ;D). We consider the following loss function. Define
`(θ; d) = −〈θ, d〉, θ ∈ B, d ∈ {− 1√
p
,
1√
p
}p (3)
For any dataset D = {d1, . . . , dn} with data points drawn from {− 1√p , 1√p}p, and any θ ∈ B, define
L(θ;D) = −〈θ,
n∑
i=1
di〉 (4)
Clearly, L is linear and, hence, Lipschitz and convex. Note that, whenever ‖∑ni=1 di‖2 > 0, θ∗ =∑n
i=1 di
‖∑ni=1 di‖2 is the minimizer of L(.;D) over B. Next, we show lower bounds on the excess risk incurred
by any  and (, δ) differentially private algorithm with output θpriv ∈ B.
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Theorem 5.2 (Lower bound for -differentially private algorithms). Let n, p ∈ N and  > 0. For every
-differentially private algorithm (whose output is denoted by θpriv), there is a dataset D = {d1, . . . , dn} ⊆
{− 1√p , 1√p}p such that, with probability at least 1/2 (over the algorithm random coins), we must have
L(θ;D)− L(θ∗;D) = Ω (min (n, p/))
where θ∗ =
∑n
i=1 di
‖∑ni=1 di‖2 is the minimizer of L(.;D) over B and L is given by (4).
Proof. Let A be an -differentially private algorithm for minimizing L and let θpriv denote its output. First,
observe that for any θ ∈ B and datasetD, L(θ;D)−L(θ∗;D) = ‖∑ni=1 di‖2 (1− 〈θ, θ∗〉). Hence, we have
L(θ;D)−L(θ∗;D) ≥ 12‖
∑n
i=1 di‖2‖θ−θ∗‖22. This is due to the fact that ‖θ−θ∗‖22 = ‖θ∗‖22+‖θ‖22−2〈θ, θ∗〉
and the fact that θ∗, θ ∈ B.
Let M = Ω (min (n, p/)) be as in Part 1 of Lemma 5.1. Suppose, for the sake of a contradiction,
that for every dataset D ⊆ {− 1√p , 1√p}p with ‖
∑n
i=1 di‖2 ∈ [M − 1,M + 1], with probability more
than 1/2, we have ‖θpriv − θ∗‖2 6= Ω (1). Let A˜ be an -differentially private algorithm that first runs A
on the data and then outputs Mn θ
priv. Note that this implies that for every dataset D ⊆ {− 1√p , 1√p}p with
‖∑ni=1 di‖2 ∈ [M−1,M+1], with probability more than 1/2, ‖A˜(D)−q(D)‖2 6= Ω (min (1, pn)) which
contradicts Part 1 of Lemma 5.1. Thus, there must exist a dataset D ⊆ {− 1√p , 1√p}p with ‖
∑n
i=1 di‖2 =
Ω (min (n, p/)) such that with probability at least 1/2, we have ‖θpriv − θ∗‖2 = Ω (1). Therefore, from
the observation we made in the previous paragraph, we have, with probability at least 1/2, L(θpriv;D) −
L(θ∗;D) = Ω (min (n, p/)) .
Theorem 5.3 (Lower bound for (, δ)-differentially private algorithms). Let n, p ∈ N,  > 0, and δ = o( 1n).
For every (, δ)-differentially private algorithm (whose output is denoted by θpriv), there is a dataset D =
{d1, . . . , dn} ⊆ {− 1√p , 1√p}p such that, with probability at least 1/3 (over the algorithm random coins), we
must have
L(θ;D)− L(θ∗;D) = Ω (min (n,√p/))
where θ∗ =
∑n
i=1 di
‖∑ni=1 di‖2 is the minimizer of L(.;D) over B and L is given by (4).
Proof. We use Part 2 of Lemma 5.1 and follow the same lines of the proof of Theorem 5.2.
Dependence on L and ‖C‖2: Although our lower bounds above are derived for L = 1 and ‖C‖2 = 2,
one can easily get their counterparts in the general case, i.e., for arbitrary values of L and ‖C‖2. The only
difference is that the lower bounds for the general case pick up an extra factor of L‖C‖2. To see this, let
L = α and ‖C‖2 = 2β for arbitrary α, β > 0. First, we change (inflate or shrink) the parameter set from
B to βB and we change our loss function in (3) to ˜`(θ; d) = −α〈θ, d〉, θ ∈ βB, d ∈ {− 1√p , 1√p}p. Let’s
denote the corresponding big loss function by L˜. Let θ† be the minimizer of L˜(.;D). Now, note that θ† =
β
∑n
i=1 di
‖∑ni=1 di‖2 = βθ∗ where θ∗ is the minimizer of our original big loss function L(.;D) given by (4). Finally,
observe that for any θ ∈ βB and dataset D, we have L˜(θ;D) − L˜(θ†;D) = αβ
(
L
(
θ
β ;D
)
− L(θ∗;D)
)
.
This shows that our bounds above get scaled by L‖C‖2 in the general case. Hence, given our upper bounds
in Sections 2 and 3, our lower bounds in this section are tight for all values of L and ‖C‖2.
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5.2 Lower bounds for Strongly Convex Functions
We give here lower bounds on the excess risk of  and (, δ) differentially private optimization algorithms for
the class of strongly convex decomposable loss functionL(θ;D). Let `(θ; d) be half the squared L2-distance
between θ ∈ B and d ∈ {− 1√p , 1√p}p, that is
`(θ; d) =
1
2
‖θ − d‖22 (5)
Note that `, as defined, is 1-Lipschitz and 1-strongly convex. For a datasetD = {d1, . . . , dn} ⊆ {− 1√p , 1√p}p,
the decomposable loss function is defined as
L(θ;D) = 1
2
n∑
i=1
‖θ − di‖22 (6)
Notice that the minimizer of L(.;D) over B is θ∗ = 1n
∑
di which is equal to q(D) in the terminology of
Lemma 5.1. Note also that we can write the excess risk as
L(θpriv;D)− L(θ∗) = n
2
‖θpriv − q(D)‖22 (7)
Theorem 5.4 (Lower bound for -differentially private algorithms). Let n, p ∈ N and  > 0. For every
-differentially private algorithm (whose output is denoted by θpriv), there is a dataset D = {d1, . . . , dn} ⊆
{− 1√p , 1√p}p such that, with probability at least 1/2 (over the algorithm random coins), we must have
L(θpriv;D)− L(θ∗;D) = Ω
(
min
(
n,
p2
2n
))
where θ∗ = 1n
∑
di is the minimizer of L(.;D) over B and L is given by (6).
Proof. The proof follows directly from (7) and Part 1 of Lemma 5.1.
Theorem 5.5 (Lower bound for (, δ)-differentially private algorithms). Let n, p ∈ N,  > 0, and δ = o( 1n).
For every (, δ)-differentially private algorithm (whose output is denoted by θpriv), there is a dataset D =
{d1, . . . , dn} ⊆ {− 1√p , 1√p}p such that, with probability at least 1/3 (over the algorithm random coins), we
must have
L(θpriv;D)− L(θ∗;D) = Ω
(
min
(
n,
p
2n
))
where θ∗ = 1n
∑
di is the minimizer of L(.;D) over B and L is given by (6).
Proof. The proof follows directly from (7) and Part 2 of Lemma 5.1.
Dependence on L, ‖C‖2, and ∆: Our lower bounds in this section are derived for the case where L =
∆ = 1 and ‖C‖2 = 2. For any values L, ‖C‖2, and ∆ such that ∆‖C‖2L = Ω(1), these lower bounds
pick up an extra factor of L
2
∆ . To see this, let L = α and ‖C‖2 = 2β for arbitrary α, β > 0. First,
instead of the data universe {− 1√p , 1√p}p, we choose the dataset entries from {− β√p , β√p}p and let any such
dataset be denoted by D˜. We change the parameter set from B to βB and change the loss function in
(5) to ˜`(θ, d˜) = α2β‖θ − d˜‖22, θ ∈ βB, d˜ ∈ {− β√p , β√p}p. Clearly, ˜`(., d˜) is α-Lipschitz and αβ -strongly
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convex. Let L˜ denote the corresponding big loss function and θ† denote the minimizer of L˜(.; D˜). Note
that θ† = q(D˜) = βθ∗ where θ∗ is the minimizer of our original big loss function L(;D) given by (6)
for the dataset D = 1β D˜. Finally, observe that for any θ ∈ βB and dataset D˜ ⊆ {− β√p , β√p}p, we have
L˜(θ; D˜) − L˜(θ†; D˜) = αβ
(
L
(
θ
β ;D
)
− L(θ∗;D)
)
where D = 1β D˜ ⊆ {− 1√p , 1√p}p. This shows that the
lower bounds in this case get scaled by αβ = α
2
α/β = L
2/∆. In fact, this is true as long as ∆‖C‖2L = Ω(1).
Hence, our upper bounds in Sections 2 and 4 imply that our lower bounds are tight for all values of
L, ‖C‖2, and ∆ for which ∆‖C‖2L = Ω(1). In other words, in the general case (where ∆‖C‖2L is not necessarily
Ω(1)), these lower bounds are tight up to a factor of ∆‖C‖2L .
6 Efficient Sampling from Logconcave Distributions over Convex Sets and
The Proof of Theorem 3.4
In this section, we discuss a generic construction of an efficient algorithm for sampling from a logconcave
distribution over an arbitrary convex bounded set. Such algorithm gives a multiplicative distance guarantee
on the distribution of its output, that is, it outputs a sample from a distribution that is within a constant
factor (close to 1) from the desired logconcave distribution. As a by-product of our generic construction, we
give the construction of our efficient -differentially private algorithm Aeff−exp−samp whose construction is
outlined in Section 3.2 and prove Theorem 3.4. As argued in Section 3.2, we will assume that the convex
set is already in isotropic position. The reader may refer to Section 3.2 for the details of dealing with the
general case (where the set is not necessarily isotropic) and the effect of that on the running time.
We start by the following lemma which describes AlgorithmAcube−samp for sampling from a distribution
proprtional to a given logconcave function F defined over a hypercube A.
Lemma 6.1. LetA ⊂ Rp be a p-dimensional hypercube with edge length τ . Let F be a logconcave function
that is strictly positive over A where logF is η-Lipschitz. Let µA be the probability measure induced by
the density F∫
u∈A
F (u)du
. Let ˜ > 0. There is an algorithm Acube−samp that takes A, F, η and ˜ as inputs,
and outputs a sample θ˜ ∈ A that is drawn from a continuous distribution µˆA over A with the property that
Dist∞(µˆA, µA) ≤ ˜. Moreover, the running time of Acube−samp is
O
(
η2τ2
˜2
p3 max
(
p log
(ητp
˜
)
, ητ
))
.
Proof. Let γ = ˜2η√p . We construct a grid Gγ , {u ∈ Rp : uj + γ2 is integer multiple of γ, 1 ≤ j ≤ p}.
Next, we run the grid-walk algorithm of [2] with the logconcave weight functionF onA∩Gγ . It follows from
the results of [2] that (i) the grid-walk is a lazy, time-reversible Markov chain, (ii) the stationary distribution
of such grid-walk is pi = F∑
u∈A∩Gγ F (u)
, and (iii) the grid-walk has conductance φ ≥ ˜
8ητp
3
2 e
˜
2
. We run the
grid-walk for t∞ steps (namely, the L∞ mixing time2 of the walk) and output a sample uˆ ∈ A ∩ Gγ . Then,
we uniformly sample a point θ from the grid cell whose center is uˆ. Let pˆi denote the distribution of the
output uˆ of the grid-walk after t∞ steps. Let µˆA, as in the statement of the lemma, denote the distribution
of θ that is uniformly sampled from the grid cell whose center is uˆ. Now, suppose that after t∞ steps it is
2That is, the mixing time w.r.t. the relative distance Dist∞ defined in Section 3.2
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guaranteed to have Dist∞(pˆi, pi) ≤ ˜2 . Then, since logF is η-Lipschitz and γ = ˜2η√p (where, as defined
above, γ is the edge length of every cell of Gγ), it is easy to show that Dist∞(µˆA, µA) ≤ ˜. Hence, it remains
to show a bound on t∞, the L∞ mixing time of the Markov chain given by the grid-walk. Specifically, t∞
is the number of the steps on the grid-walk required to have Dist∞(pˆi, pi) ≤ ˜2 . Towards this end, we use
the result of [38] on the rapid mixing of lazy Markov chains with finite state space. We formally restate this
result in the following lemma.
Lemma 6.2 (Theorem 1 in [38]). Let P be a lazy, time reversible Markov chain over a finite state space
Γ. Then, the time t∞ required for relative L∞ convergence of ′ is at most 1 +
∫ 4/′
4pi∗
4dx
xΦ2(x)
. Here, Φ(x) =
inf{φS : pi(S) ≤ x} where φS denotes the conductance of the set S ⊆ Γ and pi∗ is the minimum probability
assigned by the stationary distribution.
Now, setting ′ = ˜2 in the above lemma and using the fact that Φ(x) ≥ φ ≥ ˜
8ητp
3
2 e
˜
2
for all x, we get
t∞ = O
(
η2τ2p3
˜2
log
(
1
˜pi∗
))
.
Observe that
pi(u) =
F (u)∑
v∈A∩Gγ F (v)
≥ e
−ητ(
τ
γ
)p
where the last inequality follows from the fact that logF is η-Lipschitz. Plugging the value we set for γ, we
get t∞ = O
(
η2τ2
˜2
p3 max
(
p log
(ητp
˜
)
, ητ
))
. This completes the proof.
Now, suppose we are given an arbitrary bounded convex set C and a logconcave function F (θ) =
e−f(θ), θ ∈ C where f is a convex η−Lipschitz function on C. Having AlgorithmAcube−samp of Lemma 6.1
in hand, we now construct an efficient algorithm Ainit−samp that, with probability at least 1/2, outputs a
sample in C from a distribution close (w.r.t. Dist∞) to the distribution on C proportional to F . Our algorithm
Ainit−samp does this by first enclosing the set C by a hypercube A, then constructing a convex Lipschitz
extension of f over A (note that we need this step since f may not be defined outside C). Using a standard
trick in literature, our algorithm modulates F by a guage function to reduce the weight attributed to points
outside C. Namely, given the convex Lipschitz extension of f over A, denoted as f¯ , Algorithm Ainit−samp
defines a modified function F˜ (θ) = e−f¯(θ)−ψ¯α(θ) where ψ¯α is our guage function with a tuning parameter
α. The function ψ¯α is chosen such that it is zero inside C and is montonically increasing outside C as we
move away from C. The exact form of ψ¯α will be given shortly. Algorithm Ainit−samp then calls Algorithm
Acube−samp on inputs A and Fˆ . By appropriately choosing the parameter α of our gauge function, it is
guaranteed that, with probability at least 1/2, Acube−samp will return a sample in C. Thus, by Lemma 6.1,
we reach the desired goal.
The function ψ¯α(θ) is defined through the Minkowski’s norm of θ.The Minkowski’s norm of θ ∈ Rp
with respect to C, denoted as ψ(θ), is defined as ψ(θ) = inf{r > 0 : θ ∈ rC}. We define ψ¯α(θ) ,
α ·max{0, ψ(θ) − 1} for some tuning parameter α > 0 (to be specified later). Note that ψ¯α(θ) > 0 if and
only if θ /∈ C since 0p ∈ C (as C is assumed to be in isotropic position) and C is convex. Moreover, it is not
hard to verify that ψ¯α is α-Lipschitz when C is in isotropic position.
Before we give the precise construction of Algorithm Ainit−samp, we discuss first an important step in
this algorithm, namely, the construction of convex Lipschitz extension of f . The following lemma (which
is a variant of Theorem 1 in [13]) asserts that any convex Lipschitz efficiently computable function defined
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over some convex set C has a Lipschitz extension (with the same Lipschitz constant) over Rp that is also
convex and efficiently computable where the computation efficiency of the extension is granted under the
assumption of the existence of some projection oracle.
Lemma 6.3 (Convex Lipschitz extension, Theorem 1 in [13]). Let f be an efficiently computable, η-
Lipschitz, convex function defined on a convex bounded set C ⊂ Rp. Then there exists an efficiently com-
putable, η-Lipschitz convex function f¯ defined overRp such that f¯ , restricted to C, is equal to f . The efficient
computation of f¯ is based on the assumption of the existence of a projection oracle.
For clarity and completeness, we give a proof of this lemma here.
Proof. For the sake of simplicity, let’s assume that C is closed. Actually, this is no loss of generality since
we can always redefine f such that it is defined on the closure of C which is possible because f is continuous
on C. We use a standard extension in literature. Namely, define
gy(x) , f(y) + η‖x− y‖2, y ∈ C, x ∈ Rp
f¯(x) = min
y∈C
gy(x), x ∈ Rp.
As a standard result (for example, see [14]), we know that the function f¯ on Rp is η-Lipschitz extension of
f . Moreover, since f is convex and C is a convex set, then for every x ∈ Rp, the computation of f¯(x) is
a convex program which can be implemented efficiently using a linear optimization oracle. In particular, a
projection oracle would suffice and hence f¯ is efficiently computable. It remains to show that f¯ is convex.
Let x1, x2 ∈ Rp. Let y1 and y2 denote the minimizers of gy(x1) and gy(x2) over y ∈ C, respectively. Let
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Define xλ = λx1 + (1 − λ)x2 and let yλ denote the minimzer of gy(xλ) over y ∈ C. Now,
observe that
f¯(xλ) = gyλ(xλ) ≤ gλy1+(1−λ)y2(xλ)
= f(λy1 + (1− λ)y2) + η‖λ(y1 − x1) + (1− λ).(y2 − x2)‖2
≤ λ (f(y1) + η‖y1 − x1‖2) + (1− λ) (f(y2) + η‖y2 − x2‖2)
= λf¯(x1) + (1− λ)F (x2)
where the inequality in the first line follows from the fact that yλ is the minimzer (w.r.t. y) of gy(xλ) and
the inequality in the third line follows from the convexity of f and the L2-norm. This completes the proof
of the lemma.
Now, we give the construction of AlgorithmAinit−samp followed by a Lemma asserting the probabilistic
guarantee discussed above.
Lemma 6.4. With probability at least 1/2, Ainit−samp (Algorithm 5 above) outputs θ˜ ∈ C. Moreover, the
conditional distribution of θ˜ conditioned on the event θ˜ ∈ C is at multiplicative distance Dist∞ which is
at most ˜ from the distribution induced by F over C, i.e., within multiplicative distance ˜ from the desired
distribution e
−f(θ)∫
θ∈C
e−f(θ)dθ , θ ∈ C. The running time of Ainit−samp is
O
(
η˜2τ2
˜2
p3 max
(
p log
(
η˜τp
˜
)
, η˜τ
))
where η˜ = max(η‖C‖2, p).
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Algorithm 5 Ainit−samp: Efficient Log-Concave Sampling with a Probabilistic Guarantee
Input: A bounded convex set C, a convex function f defined over C, Lipschitz constant η of f , desired
multiplicative distance guarantee ˜.
1: Find a cube A ⊇ C with edge length τ = ‖C‖∞.
2: Find a convex Lipschitz extension f¯(θ) = min
u∈C
(f(u) + η‖θ − u‖2).
3: ψ¯α(θ) = α ·max{0, ψ(θ) − 1} with α = 3e2˜(η‖C‖2 + p), where ψ(θ) is the Minkowski’s norm of θ
w.r.t. C as defined above.
4: F (θ) = e−f¯(θ)−ψ¯α(θ).
5: Output θ˜ = Acube−samp
(
A,F, η + α, ˜2
)
Proof. By Lemma 6.1, we know that θ˜ (the output of Acube−samp in Step 5) has a distribution µˆA with the
property that Dist∞(µˆA, µA) ≤ ˜ where µA(u) = F (u)∫
v∈A
F (v)dv
, u ∈ A. We will show that ∫
θ∈A\C
µˆA(θ)dθ ≤∫
θ∈C
µˆA(θ)dθ. In particular, it suffices to show that
∫
θ∈A\C
F (θ)dθ ≤ e−2˜ ∫
θ∈C
F (θ)dθ. Towards this end,
consider a differential (p-dimensional) cone with a differential angle dω at its vertex which is located at the
origin (i.e., inside C since C is in isotropic position). Let θ0 be the point where the axis of the cone intersects
with the boundary of C. The set C divides the cone into two regions; one inside C and the other is outside
C. We now show that, for any such cone, the integral of F over its region outside C, denoted by Iout, is less
than the integral of e−2˜F over the region inside C which is denoted by Iin. First, observe that
Iin = dω p‖θ˜‖p2
∫ 1
0
e−f¯(rθ0)rp−1dr ≥ dω p‖θ˜‖p2e−f¯(θ0)
∫ 1
0
e−η‖C‖2(1−r)rp−1dr
= dω p‖θ˜‖p2e−f¯(θ0)
∫ 1
0
e−η‖C‖2r(1− r)p−1dr ≥ dω p‖θ˜‖p2e−f¯(θ0)
∫ 1
η‖C‖2+p
0
(1− η‖C‖2r)(1− pr)dr
≥ dω p‖θ˜‖p2e−f¯(θ0)
∫ 1
η‖C‖2+p
0
(1− (η‖C‖2 + p) r) dr = dω p‖θ˜‖p2e−f¯(θ0)
1
2(η‖C‖2 + p)
where the second inequality in the first line follows from the Lipschitz property of f¯ and the second inequal-
ity in the second line follows from the fact that e−x ≥ 1− x and (1− x)p−1 ≥ 1− px. On the other hand,
we can upper bound Iout as follows.
Iout ≤ dω p‖θ˜‖p2
∫ ∞
1
e−f¯(rθ0)e−α(r−1)rp−1dr ≤ dω p‖θ˜‖p2e−f¯(θ0)
∫ ∞
1
eη‖C‖2(r−1)e−α(r−1)rp−1dr
≤ 2(η‖C‖2 + p)Iin
∫ ∞
0
e−(α−(η‖C‖2+p))r ≤ e−2˜Iin (8)
where the last inequality follows from the setting of α we made in Algorithm 5. Since this is true for any
differential cone as described above, this proves that Ainit−samp outputs θ˜ ∈ C with probability at least 1/2.
Next, let Good denote the event that θ˜ ∈ C and let µˆGood denote the conditional distribution of θ˜
conditioned on Good. Let µC denote the distribution induced by F on C, that is, F∫
θ∈C F (θ)dθ
. Observe that,
for any measurable set U ⊆ C, µˆGood(U) = µˆA(U)µˆA(C) . Now, since µC(U) =
µA(U)
µA(C) , by Lemma 6.1, we have
Dist∞ (µˆGood, µC) ≤ ˜.
Finally, regarding the running time of Ainit−samp, note that, as pointed out at the end of Section 3.2,
we assume that f is efficiently computable and that there exist a membership oracle (to efficiently test
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the membership of a point w.r.t. C) and a projection oracle (to efficiently construct the convex Lipschitz
extension f¯ ). This enables us to efficiently implement the first four steps of Ainit−samp. However, we do
not take into account the extra polynomial factor in running time that is required to perform those steps
since it would be highly dependent on the specific structure of C. Thus, under this assumption, the running
time of Ainit−samp is the same as the running time of Acube−samp with inputs A, F, η + α, and ˜2 . The
expression in the lemma follows directly from the running time of Acube−samp in Lemma 6.1 and the fact
that η + α = O (max(η‖C‖2, p)).
Now, using a standard boosting approach, we construct an algorithm Aeff−samp that outputs a sample
θ ∈ C with probability 1 whose distribution is at multiplicative distance at most ˜ from the desired distibution
on C.
Algorithm 6 Aeff−samp: Efficient Log-Concave Sampling over a Convex Set
Input: A bounded convex set C, a convex function f defined over C, Lipschitz constant η of f , desired
multiplicative distance guarantee ˜.
1: Find τ = ‖C‖∞.
2: Set m = 4η‖C‖2 + p log(‖C‖2) + log
(
1
1−e− ˜4
)
.
3: for 1 ≤ i ≤ m do
4: θ˜ = Ainit−samp(C, f, η, ˜4).
5: if θ˜ ∈ C then
6: Output θ˜ and abort.
7: Output a unifromly random sample θ˜ from the unit ball B. (Note that B ⊆ C since C is in isotropic
position.)
Lemma 6.5. Let µˆC denote the distribution of θ˜ (the output of Algorithm Aeff−samp) and µC denote the
desired distribution e
−f∫
θ∈C
e−f(θ)dθ on C. We have Dist∞(µˆC , µC) ≤ ˜. Moreover, the running time ofAeff−samp
is
O
(
η˜2τ2
˜2
p3 ·max
(
p log
(
η˜τp
˜
)
, η˜τ
)
·max
(
p log(‖C‖2), η‖C‖2, log
(
1
˜
)))
where η˜ = max(η‖C‖2, p).
Proof. Let µˆGood denote the conditional distribution of θ˜ (the output of AlgorithmAeff−samp) conditioned on
the event that Ainit−samp outputs a sample in C in one of the m iterations of the for loop. From Lemma 6.4,
it is easy to see that the probability measure of the output of Aeff−samp can be expressed as
dµˆC(θ˜) = (1− 2−m)dµˆGood(θ˜) + 2−m · 1
Vol(B)
· 1(θ˜ ∈ B)
where 1(.) is the standard indicator function, i.e., it takes value 1 whenever θ˜ ∈ B and zero otherwise. Also,
from Lemma 6.4, we know that Dist∞(µˆGood, µC) ≤ ˜4 . Let µ∗ denote the minimum value of the density
function e
−f(θ)∫
u∈C
e−f(u)du for θ ∈ C. By the Lipschitz property of f , we have
µ∗ ≥ e
−2ητ
Vol(C) =
1
Vol(B)
Vol(B)
Vol(C) e
−2η‖C‖2 =
1
Vol(B)
e−2η‖C‖2
‖C‖p2
.
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Hence, our choice of m guarantees that
2−m
µ∗Vol(B)
≤ e ˜2
(
e
˜
2 − 1
)
.
It also guarantees that (1− 2−m) ≥ e− ˜4 . Putting this together, we get
eDist∞(µˆC , µC) ≤ e ˜4 eDist∞(µˆGood, µC) + 2
−m
µ∗Vol(B)
≤ e˜.
The running time of Aeff−samp is at most O(m · TAinit−samp) where TAinit−samp is the running time of
Ainit−samp (which is of the same order as that of Acube−samp given in Lemma 6.1). Note that Step 7 can
be carried out in linear time using standard methods in literature. Finally, by plugging in our choice for the
value of m gives the expression in the lemma statement. This completes the proof.
6.1 Efficient -Differentially Private Algorithm for Lipschitz Convex Loss
In this section, we show a straightforward construction for our efficient Algorithm Aeff−exp−samp (referred
to in Section 3.2) based on the construction established above for efficient logconcave sampling. Based
on the results established above in this section, we give a proof of Theorem 3.4 which will also be fairly
straightforward. First, fix a dataset D. Our goal is to construct an efficient version of Algorithm Aexp−samp
(Algorithm 2 from Section 3.1). To do this, we simply run Algorithm Aeff−samp (Algorithm 6 above)
with the function f instantiated with the scaled decomposable loss function 6L‖C‖2L(.;D) defined over the
convex bounded set C (which is assumed to be in isotropic position as discussed in Section 3.2). Hence,
η in our case is n6‖C‖2 . Namely, as shown below, our -differentially private algorithm Aeff−exp−samp is an
instantiation of Aeff−samp on inputs C, 6L‖C‖2L(.;D), n6‖C‖2 , and 3 .
Algorithm 7 Aeff−exp−samp: Efficient Log-Concave Sampling over a Convex Set
Input: A dataset D of size n, a bounded convex set C, convex L−Lipschitz loss function `, and a privacy
parameter .
1: L(θ;D) =
n∑
i=1
`(θ; di).
2: Output θpriv = Aeff−samp
(
C, 6L‖C‖2L(.;D), n6‖C‖2 , 3
)
.
The choice of the scaling factor 6L‖C‖2 of the loss function and the multiplicative distance guarantee of

3 is tuned to yield an -differentially private algorithm. To see this, we rely on the following simple lemma
given in [25].
Lemma 6.6 (follows from Lemma A.1 in [25]). Let , ˜ > 0. Let Q ⊆ Rp. For every dataset D, let µD
denote the distribution (over Q) of the output of an -differentially private algorithm A1 when run on the
input dataset D, and µˆD be the distribution (over Q) of the output of some algorithm A2 when run on D.
Suppose that Dist∞(µˆD, µD) ≤ ˜ for all D. Then, A2 is (2˜+ )-differentially private.
Proof of Theorem 3.4: Having Lemmas 6.5 and 6.6 in hand, the proof of Theorem 3.4 becomes straight-
forward. First, we show differential privacy of Algorithm 7. For any dataset D, let µD be the distribution
of θ proportional to e−

6L‖C‖2L(θ;D). Note that µD is the distribution of the output of Algorithm Aexp−samp
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(Algorithm 2 from Section 3.1) when  is replaced with 3 . Let µˆ
D be the distribution of the output θpriv of
Aeff−exp−samp (Algorithm 7 above). From Lemma 6.5, it follows that Dist∞
(
µˆD, µD
) ≤ 3 . Hence, from
Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 6.6, we reach the fact that Aeff−exp−samp is -differentially private.
To show the utility guarantee of Aeff−exp−samp, we first observe that the distribution of the output θpriv
is close with respect to Dist∞ to (i.e., within a constant factor of) the distribution of the output ofAexp−samp
(Algorithm 2 from Section 3.1), and hence, the utility analysis follows the same lines of Theorem 3.2.
Finally, observe that the running time of Aeff−exp−samp is the same as the running time of Aeff−samp
with η replaced with n6‖C‖2 and ˜ replaced with

3 . Also observe that τ = ‖C‖∞ ≤ ‖C‖2 and, as a standard
assumption, n = ω(p). Putting this together, we get the running time given in the statement of the theorem.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.4.
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A Straightforward Smoothing Does Not Yield Optimal Algorithms
In Section E we saw that the objective perturbation algorithm (14) of [11, 34] already matches the optimal
excess risk bounds for Lipschitz, and Lipschitz and strongly convex functions when the loss function ` is
twice-continuously differentiable with a bounded double derivative β. A natural question that arises, is it
possible to smoothen out a non-smooth loss function by convolving with a smooth kernel (like the Gaussian
kernel) or by Huberization, and still achieve the optimal excess risk bound? In this section we look at a
simple loss functions (the hinge loss) and a very popular Huberization method (quadratic smoothing) argue
that there is an inherent cost due to smoothing which will not allow one to get the optimal excess risk bounds.
Consider the loss function `(θ; d) = (y − xθ)+, where the data point d = (x, y), and x, y ∈ [−1, 1] and
θ ∈ R. Here the function f(z) = (z)+ is equal to z when z > 0 and zero otherwise. Clearly f(z) has a
point of non-differentiability at zero. We can modify the function f , in the following way, to ensure that the
resulting function fˆ is smooth (or twice-continuously differentiable). Define fˆ(z) = f(z), when z < −h or
when z > h. In the range [−h, h], we set fˆ(z) = z24h + z2 + h4 . It is not hard to verify that the function fˆ(z)
is twice-continuously differentiable everywhere. This form of smoothing is commonly called Huberization.
Let the smoothed version of `(θ; d) be defined as ˆ`(θ; d) = fˆ((y − xθ)) for d = (x, y).
With the choice of loss function ˆ`, the objective perturbation algorithm is as below. (The regularization
coefficient is chosen to ensure that it is at least β2 , where β is the smoothness parameter of
ˆ`.):
θpriv = arg min
θ∈[−2,2]
n∑
i=1
ˆ`(θ; di) +
θ2
8h
+ bθ (9)
In (9) the noise b ∼ N (0, 8 log(1/δ)
2
). In the results to follow, we show that for any choice of the Huberization
parameter h, there exists data sets of size n from the domain above where the excess risk for objective
perturbation will be provably worse than our results in this paper. We present the results for the (, δ)-
differential privacy case, but the same conclusions hold for the pure -differential privacy case.
Theorem A.1. For every h > 0, there exists D such the excess risk for the objective perturbation algorithm
in (9) satisfies:
E
[L(θpriv;D)− L(θ∗;D)] = Ω (min{n,max{nh, 1h}}) = Ω(√n) .
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Here the loss function L(θ;D) =
n∑
i=1
`(θ; di) (where D = {d1, · · · , dn}) and θ∗ = arg min
θ∈[−2,2]
n∑
i=1
`(θ; di).
Proof. Consider the data set D1 with n3 entries being (x = −1, y = 1) and 2n3 entries being (x = 1, y =
−1). In the following lemma we lower bound the excess risk on D1 for a given huberization parameter h.
Lemma A.2. Let , δ be the privacy parameters with  being a constant (< 1) and δ = Ω
(
1
n4
)
. For the data
set D1 mentioned above, the excess risk for objective perturbation (9) is as follows. For all h > 0, we have
E
[L(θpriv;D1)− L(θ;D1)] = Ω (n ·min{1, h}) .
Here the loss functionL(θ;D1) =
n∑
i=1
`(θ; di) (whereD1 = {d1, · · · , dn}) and θ∗ = arg min
θ∈[−2,2]
n∑
i=1
`(θ; di).
Proof. For the ease of notation, let Lˆ(θ;D1) =
n∑
i=1
ˆ`(θ; di). First notice two properties of Lˆ: i) the minimizer
(call it θˆ within the set [−2, 2] is at max {−2, 1− h}, and ii) Lˆ is quadratic within the range [1− h, 1 + h]
with strong convexity parameter at least n6h . Additionally notice that θ
∗ = 1 and the regularizer θ
2
8h in (9)
is centered at zero. Also by Markov’s inequality, w.p. ≥ 2/3, we have |b| ≤ 8
√
log(1/δ)
 . Now to satisfy
optimality, n|θ
priv−θˆ|
3h ≤ |b|. This suggests that |θpriv − θˆ| ≤ 3h|b|n .Therefore, the difference
(
θ∗ − θpriv) is
at least min
{
1, h
(
1− 3|b|n
)}
. Therefore the excess risk with probability at least 2/3 is Ω (n ·min{1, h}),
which concludes the proof.
Consider a data set D2 which has exactly max{n2 − 132h , 0} entries with (x = −1, y = 1) and min{n2 +
1
32h , n} entries with (x = 1, y = 1). In the following lemma we lower bound the excess risk on D2 for a
given huberization parameter h.
Lemma A.3. Let , δ be the privacy parameters with  being a constant (< 1) and δ = Ω
(
1
n4
)
. Let h < 1logn
be a fixed Huberization parameter. Then for the data set D2 mentioned above, the excess risk for objective
perturbation (9) is as follows.
E
[L(θpriv;D2)− L(θ∗;D2)] = Ω(min{1
h
, n
})
.
Here the loss function L(θ;D2) =
n∑
i=1
`(θ; di) and θ∗ = arg min
θ∈[−2,2]
n∑
i=1
`(θ; di).
Proof. For the ease of notation, let Lˆ(θ;D2) =
n∑
i=1
ˆ`(θ; di). Notice that within the range [−1 + h, 1 − h],
the slope of Lˆ(θ;D2) is max{ −116h ,−n}. By the optimality condition of θpriv, we have the following.
θpriv
4h
+ b−min{ 1
16h
, n} = 0 (10)
Solving for θpriv, we have θpriv = min
{

4 , 4nh
}
+ 4bh. By assumption h < 1/ log n and w.p. ≥ 2/3 we
have |b| ≤ 8
√
log(1/δ)
 . Therefore, w.p. ≥ 2/3, we have θpriv ≤ .
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Now notice that with the original loss function `, arg min
θ∈[−2,2]
n∑
i=1
`(θ; di) = 1. Since the loss function
L(θ;D2) has a slope of max{ −116h ,−n} in the range [−1, 1], the excess risk is Ω((1− ) min
{
1
h , n
}
) which
concludes the proof.
Finally combining Lemmas A.3 and A.2 completes the proof of Theorem A.1.
B Localization and (, δ)-Differentially Private Algorithms for Lipschitz,
Strongly Convex Loss
We use slightly different version of Aout−pert (Algorithm 3) which we denote by A(,δ)out−pert where the algo-
rithm takes as input an extra privacy parameter δ, it samples the noise vector b from the Gaussian distribution
N (0, Ipσ20) where σ20 = 4L2 log( 1δ )∆22n2 , and outputs C0 = {θ ∈ C : ‖θ − θ0‖2 ≤ ζσ0√p}.
Let A(,δ)gen−Lip denote any generic (, δ)-differentially private algorithm for optimizing a decomposable
loss of convex Lipschitz functions over some arbitrary convex set C˜ ⊆ C. Algorithm 1 from Section 2
is an example of A(,δ)gen−Lip. Now, we construct an algorithm A(,δ)gen−str−convex which is the (, δ) analog of
Agen−str−convex (Algorithm 4). Namely, A(,δ)gen−str−convex runs in similar fashion to Agen−str−convex where
the only difference is that it takes an extra privacy parameter δ as input and calls algorithms A(

2
, δ
2
)
out−pert and
A(

2
, δ
2
)
gen−Lip instead of A

2
out−pert and A

2
gen−Lip, respectively.
Theorem B.1 (Privacy guarantee). Algorithm A(,δ)gen−str−convex is (, δ)-differentially private.
Proof. The privacy guarantee follows directly from the composition theorem together with the fact that
A(

2
, δ
2
)
out−pert is (

2 ,
δ
2)-differentially private and thatA
( 
2
, δ
2
)
gen−Lip is (

2 ,
δ
2)-differentially private by assumption.
Theorem B.2 (Generic utility guarantee). Let θ˜ denote the output of AlgorithmA(,δ)gen−Lip on inputs n,D, `, , δ, C˜
(for an arbitrary convex set C˜ ⊆ C). Let θˆ denote the minimizer of L(.;D) over C˜. If
E
[
L(θ˜;D)− L(θˆ;D)
]
≤ F
(
p, n, , δ, L, ‖C˜‖2
)
for some function F , then the output θpriv of A(,δ)gen−str−convex satisfies
E
[L(θpriv;D)− L(θ∗;D)] ≤ O
F
p, n, , δ, L,O
L
√
p log
(
1
δ
)
log(n)
∆n
 .
Proof. The proof follows the same lines of the proof of Theorem 4.2 except for the fact that, in Algorithm
A(

2
, δ
2
)
out−pert, the noise vector b is Gaussian and hence using the standard bounds on the norm of an i.i.d.
Gaussian vector, we have
Pr
[
‖b‖2 ≤ ζσ0√p
]
= Pr
‖b‖2 ≤ ζ 4L
√
log
(
2
δ
)
∆n
 ≥ 1− e−Ω(ζ2)
We set ζ =
√
3 log(n) and the rest of the proof follows in the same way as the proof of Theorem 4.2.
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C Proof of Lemma 5.1
C.1 Proof of Part 1
We restate Part 1 of the lemma here for convenience.
Lemma 5.1- Part 1: Let n, p ∈ N and  > 0. There is a number M = Ω (min (n, p/)) such that
for every -differentially private algorithm A, there is a dataset D = {d1, . . . , dn} ⊆ {− 1√p , 1√p}p with
‖∑ni=1 di‖2 ∈ [M − 1,M + 1] such that, with probability at least 1/2 (taken over the algorithm random
coins), we have
‖A(D)− q(D)‖2 = Ω
(
min
(
1,
p
n
))
where q(D) = 1n
∑n
i=1 di.
Proof. We use a standard packing argument. Variants of such argument have appeared in several places in
literature, e.g., [25] and [15]. We first construct K = 2p/2 points d(1), ..., d(K) in {− 1√p , 1√p}p such that for
every distinct pair d(i), d(j) of these points, we have
‖d(i) − d(j)‖2 ≥ 1
8
.
It is easy to show the existence of such set of points using the probabilistic method (for example, the Gilbert-
Varshamov construction of a linear random (2p/2, p)-binary code over {− 1√p , 1√p} achieves this property).
Fix  > 0. Define n∗ = 120
p
 . Let’s first consider the case where n ≤ n∗. We construct K datasets
D(1), ...,D(K) where for each i ∈ [K], D(i) contains n copies of d(i). Note that for all i 6= j,
‖q
(
D(i)
)
− q
(
D(j)
)
‖2 ≥ 1
8
(11)
Let A be any -differentially private algorithm for answering q. Suppose that for every D(i), i ∈ [K], with
probability at least 1/2, ‖A (D(i))−q (D(i)) ‖2 < 116 , i.e., for every i ∈ [K], Pr [A (D(i)) ∈ B (D(i))] ≥ 12
where for any dataset D, B(D) is defined as
B(D) = {θ ∈ Rp : ‖θ − q(D)‖2 < 1
16
} (12)
Note that for all i 6= j, D(i) and D(j) differ in all their n entries. Since A is -differentially private, for all
i ∈ [K], we have Pr [A (D(1)) ∈ B (D(i))] ≥ 12e−n. Since, by (11) abd (12), all B (D(i)) , i ∈ [K], are
mutually disjoint, then
K · 1
2
e−n ≤
K∑
i=1
Pr
[
A
(
D(1)
)
∈ B
(
D(i)
)]
≤ 1
which implies that n > n∗ for sufficiently large p which is a contradiction to the fact that n ≤ n∗. Hence,
there must exist a dataset D(i) for some i ∈ [K] on which A makes an L2-error which is at least 116 with
probability at least 12 . Note also that the L2 norm of the sum of the entries of such D(i) is n.
Next, we consider the case where n > n∗. Fix an arbitrary point c ∈ {− 1√p , 1√p}p. As before, we
construct K = 2p/2 datasets D˜(1), ..., D˜(K) of size n where for every i ∈ [K], the first n∗ entries of each
dataset D˜(i) are the same as dataset D(i) from before whereas the remaining n− n∗ entries are constructed
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as follows. The first dn−n∗2 e of those entries are all copies of c whereas the last bn−n
∗
2 c are copies of −c.
Note that any two distinct datasets D˜(i), D˜(j) in this collection differ in exactly n∗ entries. Let A be any
-differentially private algorithm for answering q. Suppose that for every i ∈ [K], with probability at least
1/2, we have
‖A
(
D˜(i)
)
− q
(
D˜(i)
)
‖2 < 1
16
n∗
n
(13)
Note that for all i ∈ [K], q
(
D˜(i)
)
= n
∗
n q
(D(i)) + α where α = cn if n − n∗ is odd and 0 if n − n∗
is even. Now, we define an algorithm Aˆ for answering q on datasets D of size n∗ as follows. First, Aˆ
appends dn−n∗2 e copies of c followed by bn−n
∗
2 c copies of −c to D to get a dataset D˜ of size n. Then, it
runs A on D˜ and outputs nn∗
(
A(D˜)− α
)
. Hence, by the post-processing propertry of differential privacy,
Aˆ is -differentially private since A is -differentially private. Thus, assumption (13) implies that for every
i ∈ [K], with probability at least 1/2, we have ‖Aˆ (D(i))− q (D(i)) ‖2 < 116 . However, this contradicts our
result in the first part of the proof. Therefore, there must exist a dataset D˜(i) in the above collection such
that, with probability at least 1/2,
‖A
(
D˜(i)
)
− q
(
D˜(i)
)
‖2 ≥ 1
16
n∗
n
=
1
320
p
n
.
Note also that the L2 norm of the sum of entries of such D˜(i) is always between n∗ − 1 and n∗ + 1.
Summing up, we have shown that for every n and every  > 0, there is a number M = Ω (min(n, p/))
such that for every -differentially private algorithm A, there exists a dataset D of size n with the property
that ‖∑n`=1 d`‖2 ∈ [M − 1,M + 1] such that, with probability at least 1/2,
‖A(D)− q(D)‖2 ≥ 1
16
min
(
1,
p
20n
)
= Ω
(
min
(
1,
p
n
))
.
C.2 Proof of Part 2
We restate below Part 2 of the lemma.
Lemma 5.1- Part 2: Let n, p ∈ N,  > 0, and δ = o( 1n). There is a number M = Ω
(
min
(
n,
√
p/
))
such
that for every (, δ)-differentially private algorithm A, there is a dataset D = {d1, . . . , dn} ⊆ {− 1√p , 1√p}p
with ‖∑ni=1 di‖2 ∈ [M − 1,M + 1] such that, with probability at least 1/3 (taken over the algorithm ran-
dom coins), we have
‖A(D)− q(D)‖2 = Ω
(
min
(
1,
√
p
n
))
where q(D) = 1n
∑n
i=1 di.
Proof. Let n ∈ N. Fix  > 0 and δ = o( 1n). Let A be any (, δ)-differentially private algorithm for
answering q. Corollary 3.6 of [8] (together with Lemma 2.5 of the same reference) shows that there exists
n∗ = Ω(
√
p
 ) such that for every n ≤ n∗, there exists a dataset D ⊂ {− 1√p , 1√p}p of size n such that, with
probability at least 1/3, ‖A(D)− q(D)‖2 > 227 . Note that to reach this statement from Corollary 3.6 of [8],
first, we have to translate their definition of (α, β)-accuracy (given by Definition 2.2 in the same reference)
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to what this implies about the L2-error which is fairly straightforward. Also, note that in their construction,
the dataset entries are drawn from {0, 1}p whereas here the entries come from {− 1√p , 1√p}p, hence, we need
to take this normalization into account when we translate their statement to our setting. Moreover, by a
careful inspection of the construction in [8]3, one can show that such dataset whose existence was argued
above has the property that the L2-norm of the sum of its entries is Ω(n). (See Section 6 of [8] for details).
This gives us the desired Ω(1) lower bound on the L2-error when n ≤ n∗ = Ω(
√
p
 ).
To complete the proof, we need to consider the case where n > n∗. To do this, we follow the same
argument of the second half of the proof of Part 1 above (the pure  case). Namely, we proceed as folllows.
First, let A be any (, δ)-differentially private algorithm (where δ = o( 1n)). We construct datasets D˜ of
size n whose n∗ first entries are constructed in the same way datasets D in the first half of this proof were
constructed, and the remaining n− n∗ entries are constructed such that half of them contain c and the other
half conatin −c for some fixed c ∈ {− 1√p , 1√p}p. Then, we show that if for all such D˜, with probability at
least 2/3, ‖A(D˜) − q(D˜)‖2 < 227 n
∗
n , then there is an (, δ)-differentially private algorithm Aˆ such that for
all D of size n∗ constructed earlier, we get ‖Aˆ(D) − q(D)‖2 < 227 which contradicts the result of the first
half of this proof. Hence, there is a dataset D˜ of size n (constructed as above) such that, with probability at
least 1/3, ‖A(D˜)− q(D˜)‖2 ≥ 227 n
∗
n = Ω(
√
p
n ). Note also that such D˜ has the property that the L2 norm of
the sum of its entries lies in [M − 1,M + 1] where M is the L2 norm of the sum of the first n∗ entries of D˜
which is Ω(n∗) = Ω(
√
p
 ) (following the argument of the first half of this proof).
D Converting Excess Risk Bounds in Expectation to High-probability Bounds
In this paper all of our utility guarantees are in terms of the expectation over the randomness of the al-
gorithm. Although all the utility analysis except for the gradient descent based algorithm (Algorithm 1)
provide high-probability guarantees directly, in this section we provide a generic approach for obtaining
high-probability guarantee based on the expected risk bounds. The idea is to run the underlying differen-
tially private algorithm k-times, with the privacy parameters /k and δ/k for each run. Let θpriv1 , · · · θprivk be
the vectors output by the k-runs. First notice that the vector θpriv1 , · · · , θprivk is (, δ)-differentially private.
Moreover if the algorithm has expected excess risk of F (, δ) (where F is the specific excess risk function
of  and δ), then by Markov’s inequality there exist an execution of the algorithm i ∈ [k] for which the
excess risk is 2F (/k, δ/k) with probability at least 1− 1/2k.
One can now use the exponential mechanism from Algorithm 2, to pick the best θprivi from the list.
By the same analysis of Theorem 3.2, one can show that with probability at least 1 − ρ/2, the exponential
mechanism will output a vector θpriv that has excess risk of max
i
Excess risk(θprivi )−O
(
L‖C‖2
 log(k/ρ)
)
.
Setting k = log(2/ρ), we have that with probability at lest 1 − ρ, the excess risk for θpriv is at most
O(F ( log(1/ρ) ,
δ
log(1/ρ))). Placing this bound in context of the paper, the high probability bounds are only a
poly log(1/ρ) factor off from the expectation bounds.
E Excess Risk Bounds for Smooth Functions
In this section we present the scenario where each of the loss function `(θ; d) (for all d in the domain) is β-
smooth in addition to being L-Lipschitz (for θ ∈ C). It turns out that both for  and (, δ)-differential privacy,
3Their construction is based on robust (n, p)-fingerprinting codes (see Definition 3.3 in the same reference)
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objective perturbation algorithm (see (14)) [11, 34] achieves the best possible error guarantees, where the
random variable b is either sampled i) from the Gamma distribution with the kernel ∝ e− ‖b‖22L . or ii) from
the Normal distribution N
(
0, Ip 8L
2 log(1/δ)
2
)
. In terms of privacy, when the noise vector b is from Gamma
distribution, the algorithm is -differentially private. And when the noise is from Normal distribution, it is
(, δ)-differentially private. For completeness purposes, we also state the error bounds from [34] (translated
to the context of this paper).
θpriv = arg min
θ∈C
L(θ;D) + ∆
2
‖θ‖22 + 〈b, θ〉 (14)
Theorem E.1 (Lipschitz and smooth function). The excess risk bounds are as follows:
1. [11] With Gamma density ν1, setting ∆ = Θ
(
Lp
‖C‖2
)
and assuming ∆ ≥ β2 , we have
E
[L(θpriv;D)− L(θ∗;D)] = O (L‖C‖2p ).
2. [34] With Gaussian density, setting ∆ = Θ
(√
L2p log(1/δ)
‖C‖2
)
and assuming ∆ ≥ β2 , we have
E
[L(θpriv;D)− L(θ∗;D)] = O(L‖C‖2√p ln(1/δ) ).
Additionally when the loss function `(θ; d) is ∆-strongly convex (for θ ∈ C) for all d in the domain with
the condition that ∆ ≥ β2 , one can essentially recover the tight error guarantees for the  and (, δ) case
of differential privacy respectively. The main observation is that for the privacy guarantee to be achieved
one need not add the additional regularizer. Although not in its explicit form, a variant of this observation
appears in the work of [34]. We state the error guarantee from [34, Theorem 31] translated to our setting.
Notice that unlike Theorem E.1, the error guarantee in Theorem E.2 does not depend on the diameter of the
convex set C.
Theorem E.2 (Lipschitz, smooth and strongly convex function). The excess risk bounds are as follows:
1. With Gamma density ν1, if ∆ ≥ β2 , we have E
[L(θpriv;D)− L(θ∗;D)] = O ( L2p2
n∆2
)
.
2. With Gaussian density, if ∆ ≥ β2 , we have E
[L(θpriv;D)− L(θ∗;D)] = O (L2p ln(1/δ)
n∆2
)
.
F From Excess Empirical Risk to Generalization Error
In this section, provide a generic tool to interpret our ERM results in the context of generalization error (true
risk) bounds. For a given distribution τ , let us define true risk for a model θ ∈ C as follows.
TrueRisk(θ) = Ed∼τ [`(θ; d)] . (15)
Analogously, we define the excess risk for a given a given model θ by ExcessRisk(θ).
ExcessRisk(θ) = Ed∼τ [`(θ; d)]−min
θ∈C
Ed∼τ [`(θ; d)] . (16)
Let D be a data set of n data samples drawn i.i.d. from the distribution τ . The following theorem from
learning theory relates true excess risk to excess empirical risk.
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Theorem F.1 (Section 5.4 from [42]). Let ` be L−Lipschitz, ∆-strong convex loss function. With probability
at least 1− γ over the randomness of sampling the data set D, the following is true.
ExcessRisk(θ) ≤
√
2L2
n∆
√
L(θ;D)−min
θ∈C
L(θ;D) + 4L
2
γ∆n
.
Plugging in the utility guarantee for θpriv from Theorems 2.4 and 4.3, and using the expectation to
high-probability bound trick from Appendix D, we obtain the following.
Theorem F.2 (Lipschitz and strongly convex functions).
1. There exists an -differentially private algorithm, that outputs θpriv such that with probability at least
1 − γ over the randomness of sampling the data set D and the risk minimization algorithm, the
following is true:
ExcessRisk(θ) = O
(
L2p
√
log n · poly log(1/γ)
∆nγ
)
.
2. There exists an (, δ)-differentially private algorithm, that outputs θpriv such that with probability at
least 1− γ over the randomness of sampling the data set D and the risk minimization algorithm, the
following is true:
ExcessRisk(θ) = O
(
L2
√
p log2(n/δ) · poly log(1/γ)
∆nγ
)
.
One can use the following regularization trick to get excess risk guarantees for general convex functions.
Let `(θ; d) be an L-Lipschitz function and let ˆ`(θ; d) = `(θ; d) + ∆2 ‖θ‖22. Notice that over the convex set
C, ˆ` is (L+ ‖C‖2)-Lipschitz and ∆-strongly convex. Let ExcessRisk`(θ) denote the excess risk for the loss
function `. We can observe the following.
ExcessRisk`(θ) ≤ ExcessRiskˆ`(θ) + ∆
2
‖C‖22. (17)
Combining with Theorem F.2, plugging in (17), and optimizing for ∆, we have the following:
Theorem F.3 (Lipschitz functions).
1. There exists an -differentially private algorithm, that outputs θpriv such that with probability at least
1 − γ over the randomness of sampling the data set D and the risk minimization algorithm, the
following is true:
ExcessRisk(θ) = O
(√
p(L+ ‖C‖2)‖C‖2 (log n · poly log(1/γ))1/4√
nγ
)
.
2. There exists an (, δ)-differentially private algorithm, that outputs θpriv such that with probability at
least 1− γ over the randomness of sampling the data set D and the risk minimization algorithm, the
following is true:
ExcessRisk(θ) = O
(
p1/4(L+ ‖C‖2)‖C‖2 log(n/δ) · poly log(1/γ)√
nγ
)
.
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Note. While the dependence on n for our private algorithms in Theorem F.3 matches the bounds for the
corresponding non-private algorithms (see[42]), unlike the non-private counter parts, the private algorithms
have an explicit dependence on p. We leave it as an open problem to figure out the right dependence on p
w.r.t. excess risk for private algorithms.
Generalized Linear Models (GLM). When the loss function ` is a generalized linear function, we obtain
better bounds on the true excess risk. The following bounds are actually tight (see the note after the theorem
statement.)
Theorem F.4. Suppose the loss function `(θ; d) can be written as g (〈θ, d〉; d) where g is Lg-Lipschitz in its
first input and d ∈ X where ‖X‖2 ≤ R. Let L = LgR.
1. There exists an -differentially private algorithm, that outputs θpriv such that with probability at least
1 − γ over the randomness of sampling the data set D and the risk minimization algorithm, the
following is true assuming n = ω
(
(p/)2
)
:
ExcessRisk(θ) = O
(
L‖C‖2
√
log(1/γ)√
n
)
.
2. There exists an (, δ)-differentially private algorithm, that outputs θpriv such that with probability at
least 1− γ over the randomness of sampling the data set D and the risk minimization algorithm, the
following is true assuming n = ω
(
p/2
)
:
ExcessRisk(θ) = O
(
L‖C‖2
√
log(1/γ) log2(n/δ)√
n
)
.
The above theorem follows from Theorem 2 in [42] and the regularization trick above. Theorem F.4
shows that in case of GLM, we can essentially attain the non-private upper bound of O(L‖C‖2√
n
) which is
known to be tight: for example, if we consider a linear loss function then using a standard Central Limit
Theorem argument (or using standard lower bounds on the minimax error in parametric estimation), one can
show that the there exists a distribution on X for which the true excess risk is Ω
(
L‖C‖2√
n
)
.
For general Lipschitz loss functions, we provide a tool that can be used to obtain expectation (over
algorithm’s random coins) guarantees on the excess risk (as opposed to the high probability guarantees
given in Theorem F.3 above.)
For any L-Lipschitz loss function ` and any distribution τ from which the data points d1, ..., dn com-
prising the dataset D are drawn in i.i.d. fashion, we define
EmpExcRisk(θ) , 1
n
Ed1,...,dn∼τ
[
L(θ;D)−min
θ′∈C
L(θ′;D)
]
.
Now, we give the following useful lemma.
Lemma F.5. 1. Let θpriv denote the output of an (, 0)-differentially algorithm. We have
E
[
ExcessRisk(θpriv)
]
= O
(
L‖C‖2 + E
[
EmpExcRisk(θpriv)
])
.
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2. Let θpriv denote the output of an (, δ)-differentially algorithm. We have
E
[
ExcessRisk(θpriv)
]
= O
(
L‖C‖2 + ‖C‖22 δ + E
[
EmpExcRisk(θpriv)
])
.
where the expectation in both cases is over the random coins of the algorithm.
We can use this lemma together with our ERM upper bounds for general Lipschitz functions to give the
following expectation guarantees on the excess risk:
Theorem F.6 (Lipschitz functions: Expectation guarantees).
1. There is an
(
Θ
(√
p
n
)
, 0
)
-differentially private algorithm, that outputs θpriv such that the following
is true:
E
[
ExcessRisk(θpriv)
]
= O
(
L‖C‖2
√
p
n
)
.
2. There exists an
(
Θ
(
p1/4 log(n/δ)√
n
)
, δ
)
-differentially private algorithm, that outputs θpriv such that
the following is true:
E
[
ExcessRisk(θpriv)
]
= O
(
L‖C‖2 p
1/4 log(n/δ)√
n
)
.
where the expectation in both cases is over the random coins of the algorithm.
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